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I. Introduction
With New York’s enactment of the Raise the Age law, the
State’s Legislature codified the omnipresent notion that
juveniles processed in the criminal justice system should be
treated differently than adults given that they are inherently
less culpable for a multitude of reasons, both measurable and
incalculable. Flaws emanating from the minutiae of the Raise
the Age law have surfaced since it became effective on October
1, 2018, as criminal matters involving sixteen-year-old offenders
have been adjudicated in courts following the newly introduced
procedures for removal of cases involving these youth to Family
Court, or the newly-created Youth Part. Simultaneously,
adjudications of matters in which applicants have turned to the
courts to seal their criminal convictions pursuant to the Raise
the Age legislation have also revealed gaps between the law’s
intent and its execution since implementation. Presiding judges
have responded by bridging the gap between the legislation and
its execution from the bench in accordance with the progressive,
rehabilitative orientation of the Raise the Age law through
developing case law. This Article will first provide background
regarding New York’s juvenile justice system, which provides
context for the introduction and recent enactment of the Raise
the Age law, before explaining the complexities of the legislation
itself. Further, it will comment on periods of New York’s
extensive, dynamic history of juvenile justice which has reflected
social mores through present day. Furthermore, this article will
delve into several key provisions and consequent issues
materializing in the courts under these provisions, which may
endure into the second phase of implementation of the Law for
seventeen-year-old offenders as of October 1, 2019. Finally, this
article will suggest that the New York State Legislature should
amend the Raise the Age legislation in order to better facilitate
processing of sixteen- and seventeen-year-old offenders’ matters,
and sealing applications, respectively, under the law’s new
provisions. It is vital to the legislation’s permanency to precisely
mirror the ubiquitous concept embodied in the spirit of the Raise
the Age legislation and the movement that preceded it: that
adolescents are simply different than adult offenders, and their
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status as such should be accorded deference by the courts of the
State.
II. A Brief History of New York’s Juvenile Justice System
A. Twentieth Century New York: A Progressive Juvenile
Justice System
At common law and throughout the nineteenth century,
criminal prosecution of a child less than fourteen years old could
proceed only if the prosecution proved “[b]eyond all doubt and
contradiction” that the youth could understand the distinction
between right and wrong and could further understand the
consequences of the illegal act.1 This doctrine became known as
the infancy presumption and was applied in New York
throughout the nineteenth century, embodying the era’s
perception that juveniles required treatment and rehabilitation
in response to wrongdoing, since those juveniles who did not
know right from wrong, by extension, could not be deterred by
virtue of the fact that they could not be assigned blame for their
choices.2 To that end, separate children’s parts of the criminal
courts of New York City were established in 1901.3 The 1922
Children’s Court Act codified the rehabilitative focus of the
juvenile justice system that had predicated it4 and “completed
1. * Sara Gomes is a third-year law student at the Elisabeth Haub School
of Law at Pace University, J.D. expected May 2020, and is the Executive
Acquisitions Editor for Pace Law Review. She intends to pursue a career in
matrimonial and family law post-graduation. Sara would like to extend her
wholehearted gratitude to her professors and colleagues on Pace Law Review
for their invaluable time, effort, and advice in composing this Article.
Merril Sobie, The Family Court: An Historical Survey, 60 N.Y. ST. B.J. 53, 53
(1988). This burden of proof was very difficult to sustain, leading to few
reported prosecutions. Id.
2. Id. at 54; BARRY C. FELD & PERRY L. MORIEARTY, JUVENILE JUSTICE
ADMINISTRATION IN A NUTSHELL 40-41 (4th ed. 2018).
3. Sobie, supra note 1, at 55.
4. See Merril Sobie, Pity the Child: The Age of Delinquency in New York,
30 PACE L. REV. 1061, 1066-71 (2014) (discussing how nineteenth century New
York allowed convicted juveniles to be placed in privately-maintained Houses
of Refuge instead of punitive, state-owned jails or prisons so juveniles could
participate in rehabilitative programs until they reached majority)
[hereinafter Sobie, Pity the Child]; Merril Sobie, The Juvenile Offender Act:
Effectiveness and Impact on the New York Juvenile Justice System, N.Y. L. SCH.
L. REV. 677, 677-84 (1981) [hereinafter Sobie, The Juvenile Offender Act]. See
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the divorce between juvenile and criminal courts” by removing
all youth under the age of sixteen from the jurisdiction of the
criminal court system and the procedural safeguards it afforded
for juvenile defendants.5 The Children’s Court Act provided for
the separation of children from adult offenders, showcasing that,
even in the early twentieth century, New York recognized that
placing juveniles in adult prisons was inappropriate: “No child
coming within the provisions of the act shall be placed . . . [in]
any prison, jail, lockup, or other place where such child can come
into contact at any time or in any manner with any adult who
has been convicted of a crime, or who is under arrest.”6
Notwithstanding the physical separation of juveniles from
adults, a 1927 Court of Appeals decision held that criminal due
process standards applied to delinquency actions, including a
“definite charge, a hearing, competent proof, and a judgement.
Anything less [would be] arbitrary power.”7
However, in the 1930s, New York Children’s Courts began
to adopt the informality associated with the social work model of
juvenile justice, as exemplified by the case of People v. Lewis, a
New York Court of Appeals decision that stripped juvenile
delinquents of the right against self-incrimination and replaced
the due process standards the Court had instituted four years
earlier with the less rigorous evidentiary standards of civil
cases.8 People v. Lewis also marked the beginning of the
informal parens patriae system.9 The legal doctrine of parens
patriae demarcated the State’s right and responsibility to
substitute its own control for that of the natural parent(s) and
provided it the formal justification to intervene when parents
appeared unable or unwilling to meet their responsibilities, or
when a child was deemed to pose a problem for the community.10
generally FELD & MORIEARTY, supra note 2, at 3-4.
5. See Sobie, supra note 1, at 54-55; N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1,
§ 2 (James C. Cahill 1928) (repealed 1962) (defining “juvenile delinquency” as
pertaining to “any child under the age of sixteen years.”).
6. CRIM. PROC. art. 3, § 23.
7. Sobie, supra note 1, at 55 (citing People v. Fitzgerald, 155 N.E. 584,
586-88 (N.Y. 1927)).
8. John N. Kane, Jr., Note, Dispositional Authority and Decision Making
in New York’s Juvenile Justice System: Discretion at Risk, 45 SYRACUSE L. REV.
925, 935 (1994) (citing People v. Lewis, 183 N.E. 353 (N.Y. 1932)); see Sobie,
supra note 1.
9. Sobie, The Juvenile Offender Act, supra note 4, at 684.
10. FELD & MORIEARTY, supra note 2, at 7.
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This informal system remained largely unchanged until 1962,
when the Family Court Act (the “1962 Act”) was enacted,
effectively reorganizing and renaming New York’s Children’s
Courts as the Family Courts that exist today.11
The 1962 Act incorporated several unprecedented
provisions, including transferring exclusive jurisdiction over
crimes committed by children over the age of seven and under
the age of sixteen to the newly created Family Courts, and
providing that delinquent children under the age of sixteen could
only be confined for a maximum of eighteen months initially,
regardless of the crime.12 Further, the 1962 Act incorporated
procedural safeguards that the Children’s Court lacked: juvenile
defendants were assigned counsel, permitted to conduct
discovery, introduce evidence, and appeal adverse decisions.13
Moreover, the 1962 Act afforded family court protections such as
the potential for complete disposition of a case following
probation, no mandatory sentencing requirements irrespective
of the crime, and sealed juvenile records.14 Although the 1962
Act provided for a criminal court judge to waive into family court
a juvenile fifteen years or older if he had been charged with a
capital or life-imprisonment offense, it rejected proposals to
expand delinquency jurisdiction to eighteen-year-olds.15 Despite
the 1962 Act’s establishment of a rehabilitative foundation for
New York’s juvenile justice system, growing public fear of rising
juvenile crime, and the perception that the family courts’
dispositions were too lenient, ushered in New York’s “get tough”
era of juvenile justice policies that permeated the 1970s, ‘80s,
and ‘90s.16

11. Kane, Jr., supra note 8, at 936 (citing 1962 N.Y. Laws, ch. 686 (current
version at N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 111-1211 (McKinney through L.2019 ch. 652)).
12. Id.; Jonathan Lippman, Criminal Justice Reform is Not for the ShortWinded: How the Judiciary’s Proactive Pursuit of Justice Helped Achieve “Raise
the Age” Reform in New York, 45 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 241, 264-65 (2017).
13. Julianne T. Scarpino, Note, A Progressive State of Mind: New York’s
Opportunity to Reclaim Justice for its Juveniles, 23 J.L. & POL’Y 845, 854-55
(2015).
14. Id.; see Kane, Jr., supra note 8, at 936.
15. Scarpino, supra note 13, at 855; Sobie, The Juvenile Offender Act,
supra note 4, at 685.
16. Kane, Jr., supra note 8, at 937; see FELD & MORIEARTY, supra note 2,
at 16-18.
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1. New York’s Late-Twentieth Century Punitive Juvenile
Justice System: The Juvenile Offender Acts of 1976 &
1978
During the “get tough” era, politicians and the media
molded the perception of adolescents from vulnerable children
to frightening “super-predators” by publicizing sound bites such
as: “adult crime, adult time” or “old enough to do the crime, old
enough to do the time,” in conjunction with high profile national
cases that “fueled public outrage and spurred public debate on
juvenile justice.”17 The 1976 Juvenile Offender Act (the “1976
Act”) codified these sentiments and marked the most radical
change in New York’s delinquency laws since the establishment
of the Children’s Court in 1922.18 The 1976 Act’s community
interest provision, which weighed the unique needs of juveniles
against the considerations relative to community safety, sharply
pivoted from the previous legal notions of individualized justice
based solely on the needs and interests of the subject child.19
Among other provisions, it created a new category of designated
felonies,20 which carried stricter penalties for fourteen- and
fifteen-year-olds adjudicated delinquent while maintaining
adjudicatory and dispositional authority over these crimes in
Family Court.21
Merely two years later, the crimes of one of New York’s
juveniles became sensationalized in the media, precipitating
sweeping “tough on crime” juvenile justice reform.22 The “BabyFaced Butcher” was a fifteen-year-old defendant who was found
17. FELD & MORIEARTY, supra note 2, at 17; Kane, Jr., supra note 8, at
926 n.3 (citing Patricia Edmonds & Sam V. Meddis, Crime and Punishment: Is
the Juvenile Justice System “Creating Monsters”?, USA TODAY, Sept. 28, 1994,
at 1A) (“Robert ‘Yummy’ Sandifer, 11 years old, killed a 14-year-old neighbor
in Chicago, before being murdered himself. . . . Craig Price murdered another
at the age of 13 by stabbing his neighbor 58 times in Rhode Island. He
murdered two more at the age of 15 . . . .”).
18. Sobie, The Juvenile Offender Act, supra note 4, at 717.
19. Scarpino, supra note 13, at 856.
20. Designated felonies under the 1976 Act included violent crimes such
as murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, robbery, assault, rape, sodomy, and
arson. Kane Jr., supra note 8, at 938 n.102 (citing N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 301.2(8)
(McKinney 1987) (current version at N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 301.2(8) (McKinney
through L.2019 ch. 652)).
21. Kane Jr., supra note 8, at 937, 939.
22. Scarpino, supra note 13, at 856.
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guilty of the murders of two subway passengers in the Bronx
Family Court and sentenced to the maximum penalty for his
crimes under the Juvenile Offender Act: five years of
incarceration at a juvenile facility, with no permanent criminal
record.23
The ensuing public outcry for harsher reform
culminated in the 1978 Juvenile Offender Law, which evidenced
“the legislature’s outraged state of mind and thirst for
retribution.”24
The 1978 Juvenile Offender Act (the “1978 Act”) lowered the
age of criminal responsibility from sixteen to fourteen-years-old
for a wide range of crimes, and to thirteen-years-old for murder,
vesting adult criminal courts, instead of family courts, with
original jurisdiction over these defendants.25 Juveniles found to
have committed one of the designated felonies defined by the
preceding 1976 Act were deemed “Juvenile Offenders” and were
subject to prosecution in adult court, including public hearings,
public records, and harsher sentencing.26 For the first time since
the nineteenth century, the 1978 Act abolished the discretionary
power of the court to waive a criminal penalty regardless of the
circumstances, instead demanding mandatory incarceration for
certain violent crimes.27 Moreover, the 1978 Act expanded the
discretion of the district attorney and judge under a “reverse
wavier” process that provided for removal of a Juvenile Offender
to family court if the prosecutor found that the attendant
circumstances warranted removal, if it was more convenient to
do so, or if there was insufficient proof to convict in adult court;
or, as a catch-all, if the judge found removal to be “in the
interests of justice.”28 At later stages of the prosecution, the
23. Id. at 857.
24. Id. at 858.
25. Kane, Jr., supra note 8, at 939; Scarpino, supra note 13, at 858; Sobie,
The Juvenile Offender Act, supra note 4, at 686-87. With the Juvenile Offender
Acts, “New York’s one-hundred-and-fifty-year history of maintaining an age
threshold of sixteen for criminal prosecution (except for murder cases) ha[d]
been terminated . . . .” Id. (citing 1978 N.Y. Laws ch. 478, § 2 (repealed 2017)).
26. Kane, Jr., supra note 8, at 939.
27. Id.; see also Scarpino, supra note 13, at 858.
28. Kane, Jr., supra note 8, at 940. The court considered a number of
factors when it determined whether removal was “in the interest of justice,”
including “the seriousness and circumstances of the offense, the extent of the
harm caused by the offense, the evidence of guilt, the history and character of
the juvenile, and the impact the transfer [to Family Court] will have on the
safety of the community and the victim involved.” Id. at 940 n.130.
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district attorney possessed the power to preclude the removal of
a Juvenile Offender case to family court, even if the court would
otherwise be willing to grant a transfer.29 The reverse waiver
process was unique to New York, since other states operated
conversely by vesting principal jurisdiction over juvenile
offenders in family court and permitting waiver into adult
court.30 In the end, despite the call for harsher punishments
echoed by the 1978 Act’s wrath of retribution for juvenile
defendants, it failed to deter juvenile crime, left all juveniles
prosecuted as adults with stifling criminal records, and left those
incarcerated with adults at risk for emotional and sexual abuse,
and criminal socialization.31
In the years following the
enactment of the 1978 Act, New York’s juvenile justice system
became an emblem of the tough on crime era of the late twentieth
century and simultaneously a “paradigm [that] entrenche[d] the
state’s youngest offenders in a correctional system designed to
ensure that their first worst act [was] not their last.”32
B. The Return of Sensible Juvenile Justice in New York:
The Youth Court Act, the Public Outcry for Reform, and
the Overdue Passage of the Raise the Age Law
In deciding several pivotal cases throughout the twentyfirst century which buttressed expanding support for a criminal
justice system that accounted for the innate differences between
children and adults, the United States Supreme Court focused
on three significant idiosyncrasies characteristic of juveniles
which inherently reduces their level of culpability:
(1) [an] underdeveloped sense of responsibility, which leads
to impulsive and reckless decisions, (2) inability to remove
[themselves] from negative influences and vulnerability to such
negative influences and pressures, and (3) underdeveloped
moral character, which indicates [their] actions do not
necessarily exemplify permanent depravity.33
29. Sobie, The Juvenile Offender Act, supra note 4, at 698.
30. Kane, Jr., supra note 8, at 940.
31. Scarpino, supra note 13, at 864.
32. Id. at 857, 885.
33. Id. at 865. In each of these cases, the Supreme Court removed harsh
punishments previously imposed on juvenile offenders for decades: Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005), outlawed capital punishment for convicts
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This change in perception of “adolescent criminality” was
mirrored at the state level with a widespread break from the
zero-sum game of the 1976 and 1978 Acts due to several
contributing factors:
(a) a major decrease in the juvenile crime rate, and an even
more pronounced diminution in the juvenile violent crime rate;
(b) studies showing conclusively that treating youths as adults,
and thereby incarcerating them in adult penal institutions —as
opposed
to
juvenile
facilities—dramatically
increases
recidivism; and (c) research proving that older adolescents are
not as fully developed neurologically as adults and, as every
parent knows innately, their ability to exercise sound judgment
or control impulsive behavior is accordingly compromised.34
Recognition of the commonsense notion that adolescents are
simply different than adults sparked the push toward New
York’s liberalization of its juvenile criminal justice system,
albeit over the course of many years, ultimately leading to the
passage of the “Raise the Age” (“RTA”) law in 2017.35 The State
Legislature’s shift in focus from the charged offense to the
alleged offender reversed the 1976 and 1978 Acts’ fixation on
punishment in order to promote rehabilitation of New York’s
youth.36 Among the successful pilot programs reflecting the
Legislature’s gradual transition toward the current
rehabilitative-focused juvenile criminal justice system was
Adolescent Diversion Program (“ADP”) implemented in January
2012, which temporarily installed Youth Parts in New York’s
criminal courts that processed sixteen- and seventeen-yearunder the age of eighteen; Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 81 (2010), and
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012), invalidated the imposition of a life
sentence without parole for non-homicide convictions and mandatory life
sentences for offenders convicted of homicide, respectively. See also J.D.B. v.
North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 372 (2011) (holding that the objective inquiry of
whether a defendant understands his or her Miranda rights must account for
the child’s age as “a fact that ‘generates commonsense conclusions about
behavior and perception’”).
34. Sobie, Pity the Child, supra note 4, at 1074-75; see Stephanie
Tabashneck, Feature, “Raise the Age” Legislation: Developmentally Tailored
Justice, 32 CRIM. JUST. 13, 16 (2018) (“Far from ‘mini-adults,’ adolescents in
the throes of normative development are emotionally driven, short-sighted,
exceedingly reactive, and highly emotionally aroused.”).
35. Dineen Ann Riviezzo, Raise the Age New York, RAISE THE AGE NY 2,
http://rta-ny.artiems.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Raise-the-AgeLegislation-Summary-2017.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2019).
36. Kane, Jr., supra note 8, at 944.
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olds.37 By April 13, 2013, more than 3000 cases had been
adjudicated in these Parts, resolving most cases without jail
time or criminal records while decreasing the rate of re-arrest
among the youth who went through the program.38 The ADP’s
2013 study confirmed that New York’s misguided juvenile
criminal justice procedures had become a proxy for recidivism of
low-risk juvenile offenders.39 Further, the ADP recognized that
the process of giving “intensive treatments to low-risk
individuals,” had the inadvertent effect of increasing the
chances those juveniles would reoffend and successfully
remedied these consequences by replacing incarceration with
treatment, social service, or community service options geared
toward sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds.40 In the meantime, the
Sentencing Commission had released a report finding that the
Family Court was an unfeasible forum in which to process these
youthful offenders at the time since, among other
considerations, it lacked the ability to properly absorb a
significant number of cases and procedural protections
otherwise available in criminal court, such as a jury trial and
access to bail.41
During the 2012 State of the Judiciary Address, the
Honorable Jonathan Lippman, former Chief Judge of New York,
announced a proposal for the Youth Court Act.42 The Youth
Court Act’s incredibly progressive provisions included: (a)
raising the age of criminal responsibility to eighteen; (b)
obligatory notification of juveniles’ parent or guardian
immediately upon arrest; (c) either release to a parent or

37. MICHAEL REMPEL ET. AL., THE ADOLESCENT DIVERSION PROGRAM: A
FIRST YEAR EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVES TO CONVENTIONAL CASE PROCESSING
FOR
DEFENDANTS AGES 16 AND 17 IN NEW YORK 3 (2013),
https://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/documents/ADP_Report_Fi
nal_0.pdf.
38. Lippman, supra note 12, at 264-65.
39. See generally Ctr. for Court Innovation, Adolescent Diversion
Program in NY: Researchers Discuss First-Year Impacts (May 13, 2013),
https://www.courtinnovation.org/publications/adolescent-diversion-programny-researchers-discuss-first-year-impacts.
40. Lippman, supra note 12, at 264-65.
41. Id. at 265.
42. Id. at 266; see Jonathan Lippman, The State of the Judiciary 2012:
Balancing the Scales of Justice (Feb. 14, 2012), https://www.ils.ny.gov/
files/SOJ-2012.pdf.
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guardian with a “special appearance ticket”43 or processing in a
new youth division of the superior court; (d) prohibiting the
release of juveniles’ fingerprints; (e) adjustment44 as the first
option instead of incarceration; (f) sealing of criminal records;
and (g) a process of removal to Family Court only after a youth
is found guilty, to determine whether he or she required
supervision, treatment, or confinement at that time.45
Ultimately, the Youth Court Act lost traction after being
referred to the Codes Committee of the New York State Senate
both in 2012 and again as reintroduced in 2013.46
The renewed efforts toward raising the age of criminal
responsibility to eighteen-years-old in New York finally came to
fruition in 2014 when Governor Andrew Cuomo announced his
support for reform, and established the Commission on Youth,
Public Safety, and Justice.47
The Commission’s report
recommended that the Family Court, with judges primarily
trained in the area of family law, be given jurisdiction over
sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds charged with nonviolent
felonies and misdemeanors, among other low-level offenses.48
After gaining immense support from politicians, lawmakers, and
the public,49 and momentum in the State Assembly, the long43. A “special appearance ticket” is a “written notice issued and
subscribed by an officer . . . directing a designated person to appear at the
probation service for the county in which the offense or offenses for which the
special appearance ticket is issued were allegedly committed.” Lippman,
Criminal Justice Reform is Not for the Short-Winded, supra note 12, at 267
n.145; see Jellisa Joseph, Note, Catching Up: How the Youth Court Act Can
Save New York State’s Outdated Juvenile Justice System with Regard to
Sixteen and Seventeen-Year-Old Offenders, 7 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 219, 232
(2014).
44. “Adjustment” is a procedure under the Family Court Act that halts
the prosecution of the juvenile on the condition that the youth person completes
activities intended to promote positive youth development. See Susannah
Karlsson, Raise the Age, 26 ATTICUS 11, 12 (2014).
45. Lippman, supra note 12, at 266-68.
46. See Joseph, supra note 43, at 230-39.
47. Lippman, supra note 12, at 273.
48. Id.
49. Eli Hager, The Fine Print in New York’s Raise the Age Law, THE
MARSHALL
PROJECT
(Apr.
14,
2017
2:24
PM),
https://
www.themarshallproject.org/2017/04/14/the-fine-print-in-new-york-s-raisethe-age-law (“[F]or proponents of raising the age, the goal has always been to
keep all juveniles, accused of all crimes, out of the adult system, and to that
extent New York’s law is a compromise stitched together in Albany after many
years of contentious debate and Republican opposition.”). See generally Time:
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awaited Raise the Age legislation was enacted on April 10, 2017,
adopting many of the provisions of the Youth Court Act and
bringing New York’s juvenile justice system up to speed with the
rest of the nation.50 Thus, “[a]fter more than a century of
treating 16- and 17-year-olds as adults in the criminal justice
system, the passage of [the] Raise the Age [law] created an
entirely new [age-appropriate] system for older adolescents.”51
III. Intricacies of the Raise the Age Legislation
As the penultimate state to increase the age of criminal
accountability, the Raise the Age law hoisted New York into a
long-awaited era of age-appropriate juvenile justice.52 Arguably,
the most remarkable achievement of the Raise the Age
legislation lies in its long-awaited provision that raises the
presumptive age of juvenile accountability in New York from
sixteen- to eighteen-years-old, effective for sixteen-year-olds as
of October 1, 2018 and for seventeen-year-olds beginning
October 1, 2019.53 In so doing, the law vastly changes the
landscape for juvenile offenders in the criminal justice system,
including: prohibiting sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds from
being held in adult jails and prisons, making substantive
changes to the procedures and mechanisms in the criminal and
The Kalief Browder Story parts I-V (Spike television broadcast Mar. 2017).
50. Riviezzo, supra note 35; see Act of Jan. 23, 2017, No. A.3009-C/S.2009C, pmbl. (“[T]o amend the criminal procedure law, the penal law, the executive
law, the family court act, the social services law, the corrections law, the county
law and state finance law, in relation to proceedings against juvenile and
adolescent offenders and the age of juvenile and adolescent offenders and to
repeal certain provisions of the criminal procedure law relating thereto.”).
51. City of N.Y., One Year after Raise the Age, Misdemeanor Arrests of 16Year-Olds Decline 61%, NYC (Oct. 1, 2019) (quoting Admin. of Children’s
Servs. Comm’r David A. Hansell), https://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-themayor/news/452-19/one-year-after-raise-age-de-blasio-administration-sees61-percent-decline-misdemeanor.
52. Lawrence K. Marks, Implementing ‘Raise the Age’ Legislation,
N.Y.L.J.
(Jan.
11,
2019
11:29
AM),
https://www.law.com/
newyorklawjournal/2019/01/11/implementing-raise-the-age-legislation/. North
Carolina was the sole state besides New York that had not raised the age of
criminal responsibility to eighteen-years-old at the time of passing New York’s
Raise the Age law. Id. North Carolina’s Raise the Age law took effect December
1, 2019. Tabashneck, supra note 34; see Raise the Age – NC, N.C. DEP’T PUB.
SAFETY,
https://www.ncdps.gov/our-organization/juvenile-justice/keyinitiatives/raise-age-nc (last visited Dec. 30, 2019).
53. Riviezzo, supra note 35.
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youth justice systems, and allowing for rehabilitative services
for youth, including altering the type of placement and/or
detention juveniles may be ordered to receive.54 In addition,
parental notification of arrest will now be required for sixteenand seventeen-year-olds in police custody.55
A. The “Adolescent Offender” Designation, Youth Part
Jurisdiction, and the Removal Procedure under the
Raise the Age Legislation
The RTA law created a new class of juvenile offenders, the
“Adolescent Offender” (“AO”) class, which is statutorily defined
as “a person charged with a felony committed on or after October
first, two thousand eighteen when he or she was sixteen years of
age or on or after October first, two thousand nineteen, when he
or she was seventeen years of age.”56 The preexisting Juvenile
Delinquent (“JD”) classification was also extended to include
sixteen and seventeen-year-olds charged with misdemeanor
offenses who will be processed in Family Court pursuant to
existing JD laws, save a few exceptions for those charged with
more heinous crimes.57 If the State charges an AO as an adult,
he or she will be subject to treatment as a Youthful Offender,
meaning (s)he will be processed in the new “Youth Parts” of
criminal courts like other AOs, but will be subject to adult
sentencing laws, as was the law prior to the passage of the RTA
legislation.58 However, if the State does not deem the AO a
Youthful Offender, the judge then presiding over AO cases in the
Youth Part must take the youth’s age into account when

54. See generally Raise the Age: Overview and Implementation, N.Y.
STATE,
https://www.ny.gov/sites/ny.gov/files/atoms/files/RTAWebsite
Presentation.pdf (last visited Dec. 30, 2019) [hereinafter Raise the Age
Overview].
55. Id.
56. N.Y. CPL § 1.20(44) (McKinney through L.2019 ch. 652); see Raise the
Age Implementation: Adolescent Offender, N.Y. STATE, https://www.ny.gov/
raise-age/raise-age-implementation#adolescent-offender (last visited Nov. 3,
2019).
57. Raise the Age Overview, supra note 54, at 6.
58. Id.; see Michael A. Corriero, Judging Children as Children:
Reclaiming New York’s Progressive Tradition, 56 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 1413,
1414-15 (2011/12).
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sentencing.59,60
Further, under the RTA law, processing in the Youth Part
allows for voluntary probation services tailored to AOs and other
juvenile offenders and carries a presumption against
detention.61 This feature of the new law departs from prior
tough on crime practices which failed to render social services,
including educational, physiological, and social service
programs, which were previously solely available to juveniles
processed in Family Courts.62 Should detention be ordered pretrial, specialized secure juvenile detention facilities—created
pursuant to the guidelines of the RTA law and reserved
exclusively for AOs—will house the AOs in units separate from
JDs and/or Juvenile Offenders,63 a sharp departure from the
housing requirements under previous state laws that landed
teenagers on Rikers Island with adult offenders even prior to a
determination of their guilt.64 Judges will have the discretion to
order that AOs sentenced to less than one year serve their

59. Riviezzo, supra note 35, at 22. This notion coincides with Supreme
Court cases such as In re Gault and its progeny, which recognized that age is
a pertinent factor in a myriad of juvenile criminal matters. See sources cited
supra note 34.
60. In other words, sentencing determinations for AOs who are not
characterized as Youthful Offenders will be made cognizant of the RTA’s
recognition that their punishment should be commensurate with their
blameworthiness, which it recognizes to be tied to their age, while Youthful
Offenders will not be afforded such considerations by the court pursuant to
statute though they too are younger than eighteen-years-old.
61. Raise the Age Overview, supra note 54, at 13. AO cases processed in
Family Court may still be allowed to divert their case from a prosecutor’s office
to a probation through a process called “adjustment,” which has been available
prior to RTA for JDs. Scarpino, supra note 14, at 879-80.
62. Corriero, supra note 58, at 1416.
63. Raise the Age Overview, supra note 54, at 6; Riviezzo, supra note 35,
at 27. Youth whose cases are heard in Family Court will be detained or placed
in Office of Children and Family Services (“OCFS”) operated, OCFS-licensed,
or Administration for Children’s Services facilities, as JDs currently are. Raise
the Age Overview, supra note 54, at 6.
64. See Samantha A. Mumola, The Concrete Jungle: Where Dreams Are
Made of . . . and Now Where Children Are Protected, 39.1 PACE L. REV. 539,
540-42 (2019); see also Jennifer Gonnerman, Kalief Browder, 1993-2015, NEW
YORKER (June 7, 2015) https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/kaliefbrowder-1993-2015 (discussing the high-profile story of Kalief Browder).
Browder faced years of violence and solitary confinement on Rikers Island in
connection with his arrest for allegedly stealing a backpack, for which charges
were eventually dropped; after his release and the publicization of his story,
Browder committed suicide in 2015. Id.
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sentences in these specialized juvenile detention facilities.65
AOs who are sentenced to state imprisonment will be placed in
AO facilities specially developed by the State in conjunction with
government social service offices.66
The Youth Parts will have primary jurisdiction over AOs
charged with felony offenses and will be presided over by
specially-trained family court judges,67 who will also hear cases
of all thirteen- to fifteen-year-old Juvenile Offenders in these
Parts.68 Pursuant to a newly implemented process of removal,
all non-violent felonies allegedly committed by AOs are
automatically transferred from the Youth Part to Family Court
unless the defendant waives removal; or, the District Attorney
may file a motion within thirty calendar days of the AO’s
arraignment showing “extraordinary circumstances” that
warrant retention of the matter in the Youth Part.69 Violent
65. Raise the Age Overview, supra note 54, at 6.
66. Id. The facilities for AOs have been developed by the state with
enhanced security managed by the Department of Corrections and Community
Supervision with the assistance of the OCFS. Id.
67. Mumola, supra note 64, at 562 (citing Interview with Janet DiFiore,
Chief Judge, N.Y. State (Mar. 16, 2018)) (“To make this transition smoother
[for the Youth Parts], ‘there [were] extensive [state-wide] trainings held
throughout the summer [of 2018] . . . on the new law.’ Additionally, judges and
court staff engaged in a specialized training to better prepare them to address
cases of adolescent and juvenile offenders.”); Yyvonne Borkowski et. al., Panel
Discussion, Perspectives on the First Year of Implementation of Raise the Age,
Westchester Women’s Bar Association CLE (Oct. 3, 2019) [hereinafter WWBA
CLE] (“The statute requires that the Youth Court Judges receive specialized
training in juvenile justice, adolescent development, custody and care of youths
and effective treatment methods for reducing unlawful conduct by youths.”);
see Our Statement on the Final Phase of State-Wide Implementation, Our
Agenda for Achieving Youth Justice, RAISE THE AGE NY 1 (Oct. 1, 2019)
[hereinafter
Agenda
for
Achieving
Youth
Justice],
https://raisetheageny.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/RTANY-Statement-for10.1.2019.pdf (as of October 1, 2019, sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds falling
under the purview of the RTA law have their cases heard before a judge trained
in “adolescent development and family law”).
68. Riviezzo, supra note 35, at 4; Raise the Age Overview, supra note 54,
at 7.
69. N.Y. CPL § 722.23(1)(a) (McKinney through L.2019 ch. 652)
(“Following the arraignment of [an AO] charged with a crime . . . other than
any class A felony except for those defined in article two hundred twenty of the
penal law, a violent felony defined in section 70.02 of the penal law or a felony
listed in paragraph one or two of subdivision forty-two of section 1.20 of this
chapter, or an offense set forth in the vehicle and traffic law, the court shall
order the removal of the action to the family court . . . unless, within thirty
calendar days of such arraignment, the district attorney makes a motion to
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felonies may also be transferred from the Youth Part to Family
Court if the District Attorney timely files the same motion
showing “extraordinary circumstances.”70 Although integral to
the law and to the removal process it formed, the RTA legislation
is wholly devoid of a definition of “extraordinary
circumstances.”71 Yet, the RTA law specifies a three-part test
which retains a violent felony juvenile matter in the Youth Part
automatically if one or more is proven by a preponderance of the
evidence72: if the defendant is found to have (1) displayed a
deadly weapon in furtherance of the offense; (2) caused
significant physical injury; or, (3) engaged in certain criminal
sexual conduct.73 The term “significant physical injury” has not
been defined by the Raise the Age legislation.74 These three
factors may not necessarily constitute elements of an offense, but
the language “set forth in the accusatory instrument” may
require the People to allege so nonetheless.75 Upon the
arraignment of an AO charged with a violent felony in the Youth
Part, “the court shall schedule an appearance no later than six
calendar days from such arraignment for the purpose of
reviewing the accusatory instrument”76 and other relevant facts
prevent removal of the action . . . .”); see also id. § 722.23(1)(d) (“[T]he court
[shall] make[] a determination upon such motion by the district attorney [to
prevent removal of the case] that extraordinary circumstances exist that
should prevent the transfer of the action to family court.”); Riviezzo, supra note
35, at 15.
70. Riviezzo, supra note 35, at 15.
71. Jesse McKinley, ‘Raise the Age,’ Now Law in New York, Is Still a
Subject of Debate, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/04/10/nyregion/raise-the-age-new-york.html; see CPL § 722.23.
72. E.g., People v. D.G., No. FYC-70228-19, 2019 WL 2455461, at *12
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Cty. Apr. 4, 2019) (“In Pattern Jury Instructions, to
establish a fact by a preponderance of the evidence means to prove that
something is more likely true than not true.”); People v. M.M. (M.M. I), 97
N.Y.S.3d 426, 428 (Cty. Ct. Nassau Cty. 2019) (quoting 58A N.Y. JUR. 2D
EVIDENCE & WITNESSES § 978 (2019)) (“The well-established preponderance of
the evidence standard requires evidence that is sufficient to ‘produce a
reasonable belief in the truth of the facts asserted.’”).
73. Raise the Age Overview, supra note 54, at 15; Riviezzo, supra note 35,
at 14. These matters will “likely [represent] the majority of cases.” Hager,
supra note 49.
74. See CPL § 722.23(2)(b); infra Part II(a)(2).
75. CPL § 722.23 cmt. Vehicle and Traffic Law cases and Class A felonies
other than Class A drug offenses cannot be transferred to family court. Id.; see
RIVIEZZO, supra note 35, at 14.
76. CPL § 722.23 (2)(a).
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to determine whether the People have proved by a
preponderance of the evidence one or more of the foregoing
three-part test.77 The RTA law does not specify the nature of the
scope of the parties’ opportunity to be heard at the sixth-day
appearance.78 If a court determines the action shall not proceed
under CPL § 722.23(2) because none of the three factors are
present, it lapses into processing under CPL § 722.23(1), under
which removal to Family Court is available.

The flow chart compiled by the Westchester Children’s
Association below provides an illustrative representation of the
procedural channels of the RTA law in New York’s criminal
juvenile justice system:79

77. People v. E.B.M., 95 N.Y.S.3d 743, 745 (Cty. Ct. Nassau Cty. 2019).
This appearance is referred to by Nassau County courts as the “sixth-day
appearance” and “sixth-day hearing” interchangeably. Id. In Bronx County,
however, this appearance is referred to as a “retention hearing.” People v. N.C,
110 N.Y.S.3d 833, 834 (Sup. Ct. Bronx Cty. 2019). Meanwhile, one Monroe
County judge referred to it as “the six day review.” People v. Y.L., 104 N.Y.S.3d
839, 840 (Cty. Ct. Monroe Cty. 2019). In Westchester County it is called the
“RAI hearing.” WWBA CLE, supra note 68. See CPL § 722.23(2)(a). For the
purposes of this Article, it will be referred to as “the sixth day hearing.”
78. E.B.M., 95 N.Y.S.3d at 747; People v. B.H. (B.H. I), 89 N.Y.S.3d 855,
860 (Cty. Ct. Nassau Cty. 2018) (“[T]here is surprisingly little authority on
what constitutes the opportunity to be heard.”); see CPL § 722.23(2)(a); infra
note 111.
79.
Raise the Age Flow Chart, WESTCHESTER CHILD. ASS’N,
https://wca4kids.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Updated-Flow-Chart-1.png
(last visited Dec. 30, 2019); see also Raise the Age: 6 Months In, WESTCHESTER
CHILD. ASS’N (May 14, 2019), https://wca4kids.org/issues/raise-the-age/.
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B. The Raise the Age Law’s Sealing Provision
The RTA legislation also provides that individuals
previously convicted of up to two statutorily defined “eligible
offenses” in an adult court, but not more than one felony offense,
may apply to the court in which the defendant was convicted to
have their criminal record sealed after ten years from the
imposition of the sentence or discharge from incarceration,
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whichever is later.80 In considering any application, the court
will consider a myriad of factors, including, but not limited to:
the amount of time that has elapsed since the defendant’s last
conviction, the circumstances and seriousness of the offense, the
circumstances and seriousness of any other offenses the
defendant was convicted of, the character of the defendant,
including measures (s)he has taken toward rehabilitation or
participating in community service programs, statements made
by the victim of the offense, the impact that sealing will have on
the defendant’s rehabilitation and reintegration into society,
and the impact on public safety and the public’s confidence in
the law.81 For offenses falling outside the “eligible offenses”
designation, sealing is not available no matter how much time
has passed since the defendant committed the crime, and
regardless of how compelling a case the applicant can make for
sealing his or her record.82
The Legislature’s inclusion of the sealing provision in the
RTA law speaks to the importance it places upon the impact
criminal records can have on juvenile offenders who, upon
reentering society, are likely to face seemingly insurmountable
obligations of securing employment, housing, and education, to
name a few, with the stain of a criminal record obtained before
reaching adulthood.83 Moreover, the sealing provision found in
the RTA law seeks to make a reality that which is currently a
common misconception about juvenile records: they should be
80. See CPL § 160.59; 36A GEORGE L. BLUM & MARK GROMIS, CARMODYWAIT NEW YORK PRACTICE WITH FORMS § 208:30 (2d ed. 2018); Riviezzo, supra
note 35; see also N.Y. State Unified Court Sys., Court Help: Sealed Criminal
Records,
NYCOURTS.GOV,
https://www.nycourts.gov/courthelp/
Criminal/sealedRecords.shtml (last visited Nov. 5, 2019) (“Unlike some other
states, New York has no laws to erase or ‘expunge’ criminal records. New York
uses a process called sealing for some cases. Sealing means that the record still
exists, but all related fingerprint and palmprint cards, booking photos, and
DNA samples may be returned to you or destroyed (except digital fingerprints
are not destroyed if you already have fingerprints on file from a different
unsealed case).”).
81. CPL § 160.59.
82. People v. Jane Doe, 89 N.Y.S.3d 594, 597 (Sup. Ct. Queens Cty. 2018).
83. Joy Radice, The Juvenile Record Myth, 106 GEO. L.J. 365, 368 (2018).
Further, juvenile records can make it more difficult, if not impossible, for
convicted adolescents to serve in the military, receive financial aid, or be
granted a state occupational license. Id. They can also trigger immigration
consequences, which in today’s political climate, may result in deportation or
a denial of citizenship. Id. at 388.
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confidential (after some point in time), ultimately sealed or
expunged “because the juvenile justice system aims to
rehabilitate rather than merely punish youth.”84 In today’s
world of widespread access to information technology, the
humanitarian goals of progressive juvenile justice fail to shield
adolescents when they are completing applications for
employment or school and are asked to reveal that they have a
criminal record.85 For example, one study of sixty campuses of
the State University of New York showed that almost two-thirds
of the students who started to fill out the online Common
Application for college failed to complete and submit the
application if they answered affirmatively to question(s) about
juvenile records.86 Furthermore, employment discrimination
against ex-offenders, in general, is so pervasive that “any
sentence is effectively a life sentence they must continue serving
after their debt to society has been paid.”87 This damaging effect
is especially damning for juvenile offenders because adolescents
will likely lack a high level of education and an established
employment record, placing them at a severe disadvantage
against other applicants as their qualifications will fail to
outweigh potential employers’ fears of liability for hiring
negligently.88
Due to the dramatic impact the RTA law will have on the
courts, because cases that would have been adjudicated in
criminal court (prior to the law’s passage) will now be removed
to family court, this note will focus on the portions of the RTA
law relative to the new class of “Adolescent Offenders” and the
sealing provision. Recent decisions from the courts have
progressively shed light on the fissures left by the legislation,
resulting in challenges for those falling under the purview of the
RTA’s provisions, as well as those charged with administering
it.
IV. The First Phase of Implementation of the Raise the Age
Legislation for New York’s Sixteen-Year-Old Adolescent
84. Id. at 369.
85. See generally id.
86. Id. at 387.
87. Judith G. McMullen, Invisible Stripes: The Problem of Youth
Criminal Records, 27 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 1, 19 (2018).
88. Id. at 19-20.
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Offenders & Past Offenders Seeking to Seal Criminal
Convictions
As courts across New York state contend with the recently
implemented provisions of the RTA law, pitfalls of the legislation
have become apparent, especially with regard to provisions for
the removal and sealing of criminal records processes.89 The
obstacles arising from the vagueness of the legislation’s sealing
and removal provisions have at times obfuscated the progressive
intentions behind the RTA legislation; however, this has been
somewhat alleviated by growing case law defining the nuances
of the statute and calling attention to areas of the law apt for
improvement.
A. Sealing Provision: Adjudications Inconsistent with the
Rehabilitative Spirit of Raise the Age Expose
Legislation’s Defects
The sealing provision, Criminal Procedure Law (“CPL”)
§ 160.59, was enacted in October 2017 and provides a
mechanism for defendants to move to seal up to two “eligible
offenses,” as explained above.90 At the time of its enactment,
Governor Cuomo declared the ameliorative purpose of the
statute as an “eliminat[ion of] unnecessary barriers to
opportunity and employment that former[ly] incarcerated
individuals face and to improve the fairness of the state’s
criminal justice system.91 Accordingly, New York’s Executive
Law was amended to make it an unlawful discriminatory
89. This section of this Article is derived from reported decisions available
on online legal research services, such as Westlaw and LexisNexis and is
written cognizant of the fact that the reported cases reflect only a fraction of
decisions on sealing applications and AO matters processed through criminal
and family courts, respectively, pursuant to the RTA legislation. The judicial
opinions discussed herein are intended to showcase unique issues in growing
case law from courts administering the RTA law in its first year of
implementation.
90. CPL section 160.59(1)(a) delineates offenses that are not considered
“eligible offenses,” including, but not limited to, certain sex offense[s], violent
felony offense(s), including felonious homicide, a Class A felony, an attempt to
commit an offense that is not an eligible offense if the attempt is a felony, or
an offense for which registration as a sex offender is required, etc. N.Y. CPL
§ 160.59 (McKinney through L.2019 ch. 652).
91. People v. John Doe, 86 N.Y.S.3d 853, 855 (Sup. Ct. Queens Cty. 2018).
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practice “to make inquiry about, whether in any form of
application or otherwise, or to act upon adversely to the
individual involved, any arrest or criminal accusation” that
resulted in a conviction and was subsequently sealed.92
However, in practice, CPL § 160.59 has produced adjudications
inconsistent with the stated purpose and the language of the
statute itself.
Motions under CPL § 160.59 by individuals who were
criminally convicted decades ago, and who went on to lead lawabiding lives thereafter, were nonetheless barred from sealing
their criminal records; giving courts the opportunity to remedy
the inadequacies of the statute in its present form. While some
courts have determined sealing motions with a focus on applying
the laudable intent of the statute, others have focused on the
convictions themselves, with neither approach giving enough
substantial value to the argument that if the movant was subject
to the current RTA legislation at the time of his/her conviction,
(s)he may have been afforded sealing of his or her criminal
records without obstacle.
In Jaime S., the court granted the movant’s motion seeking
to seal the record of his convictions of numerous computer
crimes93 despite the movant falling outside the class of offenders
intended to benefit from the sealing statute, because it would
make little sense to deny him relief “until such time as his life
takes a turn for the worse” when he was applying for higher
employment at the time of filing.94 The Jaime S. court’s
auspicious approach to this case indicates that courts applying
similar logic may interpret the RTA’s sealing law based on the
impact it will have on the individual’s ability to become a
92. Jane Doe, 89 N.Y.S.3d at 596 (citing N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(16)
(LexisNexis 2019)).
93. Jaime S. pled guilty to two Class E felonies in connection with his
illicit actions while working in the IT department of a law firm between 1997
and 2002, for which he was sentenced to a five-year probationary term, which
the Court terminated over a year early, and was ordered to pay a $5,000 fine.
People v. Jaime S., 70 N.Y.S.3d 794, 797-98 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 2018).
94. Id. at 795. Although Jaime S. is “skilled and experienced in his field,”
when his employer’s company was bought out by a larger entity, the entity
rescinded its offer of employment to Jaime S. after conducting a background
check. Jamie alleged that in the fifteen years since his conviction,
approximately fifteen other job interviews had unsuccessful results, leading
him to exhaust unemployment insurance benefits and his life savings, and
causing him to become depressed and anxious. Id. at 797.
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successful member of, and contribute to, society instead of
adhering to the exact letter of the law, which would have
otherwise barred sealing in Jamie S.’ particular case and future
cases of others similarly situated.95 Nonetheless, other courts
determining sealing motions have felt constrained by the narrow
parameters of the RTA law regarding the eligibility of
convictions for sealing under the statute.
The case of John Doe showcased a movant’s attempt to
capitalize on the vagueness in the statute regarding when
multiple felony convictions can be treated as a single conviction,
which may allow for such convictions to be deemed eligible for
sealing under the quantitative prong of the statute, which only
allows for sealing of up to two offenses.96 The movant argued
that two of his criminal convictions should have been treated as
one for sealing, since they were run concurrently. However, the
Court rejected this contention since his criminal activities were
not “so closely related and connected in point of time and
circumstances as to constitute a single criminal incident.”97
Hence, under the current RTA legislation, individuals who were
convicted of more than two crimes that are considered distinct
criminal acts will not be able to consolidate the supernumerary
convictions to seal their criminal record, even if the crimes were
temporally proximate to each other.98 Yet, New York’s laws
currently entitle defendants who were drug addicted, accepted

95. See CPL § 160.59(7)(f). But see People v. Timothy S., No. 1086-05,
2018 NYLJ LEXIS 2400 (Sup. Ct. Queens Cty. July 9, 2018) (granting sealing
for a movant that fell squarely under the CPL § 160.59 sealing provision, since
his conviction of the Class E felony of promoting gambling in the first degree
is an eligible non-violent offense under the statute, occurred in 2005, and
Timothy S. had no subsequent criminal arrests or convictions).
96. John Doe, 86 N.Y.S.3d at 853-54. John Doe was a defendant arrested
twice in the span of a month and a half in 1985 for selling cocaine to undercover
police officers when he was nineteen years old. Id. He resolved both cases by
pleading guilty to two counts of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the
third degree, a class B felony, and one count of criminal facilitation in the
fourth degree. Id. Since his convictions, he worked in the New York City
Department of Sanitation for over two decades, became an active member of
his church and participated in community service, and had no contact with the
criminal justice system for over thirty years. Id. at 853-56.
97. John Doe, 86 N.Y.S.3d at 854-56.
98. See id. (holding that two felonious criminal sales of cocaine within one
and a half months did not occur sufficiently contemporaneously to deem the
acts one criminal incident, and thus disqualified the movant’s criminal record
for sealing).
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into, and completed judicial diversion programs to sealing of up
to three misdemeanor drug offenses.99 This disparity in the RTA
law’s allocation of eligibility under the sealing provision for nonviolent drug-related offenses will likely have to be addressed by
the Legislature in order to “further advance the statute’s
[explicit] laudable goals,”100 especially since it can likely be
addressed “without having a deleterious effect on public safety
or society’s respect for the law.”101
The RTA legislation’s sealing provision also fails to account
for juvenile offenders who would have received AO treatment
under the newly defined criterion for sixteen- and seventeenyear-old offenders had RTA been in place when they were
convicted.102 The Court in People v. Jane Doe was “constrain[ed]
to deny [her sealing] motion” since her conviction for second
degree robbery is considered a violent felony offense, and
therefore not an offense eligible for sealing.103 However, this
ruling defies the logic that if Jane Doe, or other movants like her
were granted the Youthful Offender status she was eligible for
at the time of her conviction, she would be eligible for sealing
today, much like a similarly situated sixteen-year-old AO under
the RTA law would be treated.104 The inequity apparent in the
99. Id. at 856-58 (noting that defendants whose cases predate the
widespread use of judicial diversion programs, but have nevertheless
demonstrably extricated themselves from any involvement with drugs are
entitled to significantly less relief). The court discussed the notion that drug
dealers and drug addicts “are often the same people,” who, as a result of their
addiction, often accumulate multiple criminal convictions. Id. at 856 (citing
Kathy Casteel, A Crackdown on Drug Dealers Is Also a Crackdown on Drug
Users, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Apr. 5, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/
features/a-crackdown-on-drug-dealers-is-also-a-crackdown-on-drug-users/).
100. John Doe, 86 N.Y.S.3d at 857.
101. Id. at 858-59.
102. Zhandarka Kurti & William Martin, Cuomo’s “Carceral Humanism,”
JACOBIN (Nov. 16, 2018), https://jacobinmag.com/2018/11/andrew-cuomojuvenile-justice-carceral-humanism-kalief-browder (“Most sixteen- and
seventeen-year[-]olds will still bear the scarlet letter of an adult criminal
record. According to the Division of Criminal Justice Services, 3,063 sixteenand seventeen-year-olds were charged in 2017 with violent felonies that the
new law’s passage would not affect.”). See N.Y. CPL § 722.23 (McKinney
through L.2019 ch. 652).
103. People v. Jane Doe, 89 N.Y.S.3d 594, 594 (Sup. Ct. Queens Cty.
2018).
104. See id. In 1984, Jane Doe was arrested and charged with one count
of robbery in the second degree in connection with a robbery that allegedly had
occurred at Queens County High School where the defendant twisted the
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sealing statute will likely be addressed by future revisions to the
RTA legislation, as discussed in Part IV(i) infra.
B. Unfolding Case Law Is Filling the Void Left by
Lawmakers to Define Vague Terminology in Removal
Provisions
As explained in Part II(i) supra, under the recently enacted
RTA legislation, sixteen-year-old AOs charged with violent
and/or non-violent felonies begin in the Youth Part of New York’s
criminal courts105; however, there are distinct procedures
employed in accordance with the degree of the crime(s) lodged
against the defendant.106 Since the District Attorney must cite
“extraordinary circumstances” in a motion in order to retain
nonviolent felonies in the Youth Part according to CPL
§ 722.23(1), courts have had to determine such motions of firstimpression while simultaneously navigating the murky waters
of the RTA law itself, which lacks any definition of extraordinary
circumstances.107 The interstices of the removal procedure in
the RTA legislation has similarly challenged courts determining
whether to remove AOs charged with violent felonies to family
court under CPL § 722.23(2). Although the three-factor test108
appears to be clear on its face, the RTA legislation is devoid of
any definition of “significant physical injury”109 or “display[ing]
a [weapon],”110 and does not delineate the scope of the
mandatory hearing scheduled for six days after the AO’s
complainant’s arm while the other perpetrators took her pocketbook and
unicorn charm. Id. at 595. When defendant pleaded guilty to one charge of
attempted robbery in the second degree, the sentencing court denied her
youthful offender treatment and sentenced her to five years’ probation, which
was terminated one year early at the request of the Department of Probation.
Id. Jane Doe moved to seal her juvenile conviction record following her
application for a job which required a criminal background check. Id.
105. As of this writing, the second phase of the RTA has been
implemented and as such, New York’s seventeen-year-olds will be subject to
the same procedure in place for sixteen-year-olds.
106. See CPL § 722.23.
107. See id. §§ 722.23(1)(a), (1)(c); supra Part II(i).
108. The three-factor test requires the state prove that the AO (i) caused
significant physical injury; or (ii) displayed a deadly weapon in furtherance of
the offense; or (iii) engaged in certain criminal sexual conduct. CPL
§ 722.23(2); see supra Part II(i).
109. See CPL § 722.23(2)(c)(i).
110. See id. § 722.23(2)(c)(ii).
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arraignment on a violent felony charge(s), during which the
court disposes of the matter based upon whether the State has
proved any of the three factors by a preponderance of the
evidence.111 Where the action does not proceed under CPL
§ 722.23(2), it reverts to processing under CPL § 722.23(1) and
the case becomes subject to the vague terminology there, i.e.
“extraordinary circumstances.”112
Courts have faced complex determinations contending with
the RTA’s resounding silence in defining “extraordinary
circumstances,”113 “significant physical injury,”114 and/or
“displayed.”115 Via their broad discretion in deciding statutory
interpretation methodology, courts have turned to the plain
meaning of the words themselves; existing case law; legislative
records (elucidating the Legislature’s intent and the overall goal
111. One court has found that “the closest analogy [to the sixth day
hearing] is the opportunity to be heard on issuance of a temporary order of
protection (‘TOP’). The key difference [being] that while a TOP hearing,
whether evidentiary or otherwise, is purely in the Court’s discretion, [the sixth
day hearing] is mandatory. In any event, the initial opportunity to be heard on
the question of removal is similar to a TOP hearing in that ‘both accusatory
instruments and supporting depositions may be considered’ and, as with most
pretrial hearings, hearsay evidence may be admitted.” B.H. I, 89 N.Y.S.3d at
860. See CPL §§ 722.23(2)(a)-(c); People v. L.M., No. IND-00000-00/000, 2019
WL 1187308, at *4 (N.Y. Cty. Ct. Nassau Cty. Mar. 12, 2019) (“[B]ecause the
statute states that the purpose of the sixth-day appearance is for the Court’s
review of the ‘accusatory instrument,’ there is no basis to find that the nature
of the proceeding differs pre- and post-indictment.”); see also People v. Y.L.,
104 N.Y.S.3d 839, 840 (Cty. Ct. Monroe Cty. 2019) (court considered People’s
exhibits attached to its affirmation, including detective’s written narratives of
separate interviews of AOs and “Facebook Live” video, to have sufficient
evidentiary foundation and to be “relevant, material, and fairly considered.”).
112. See CPL §§ 722.23(2)(c)-(d); supra Part II(i).
113. CPL § 722.23(1)(d) (“The court shall deny the motion to prevent
removal of the action in youth part unless the court makes a determination
upon such motion by the district attorney that extraordinary circumstances
exist that should prevent the transfer of the action to family court.”).
114. CPL § 722.23(2)(c)(i) (“The court shall order the action to proceed in
accordance with subdivision one of this section unless . . . the court determines
that the district attorney proved by a preponderance of the evidence . . . (i) the
defendant caused significant physical injury to a person other than a
participant in the offense . . . .”).
115. In the context of whether the AO “displayed” a weapon in
furtherance of the charged offense. See CPL § 722.23(2)(c)(ii) (“The court shall
order the action to proceed in accordance with subdivision one of this section
unless . . . the court determines that the district attorney proved by a
preponderance of the evidence . . . (ii) the defendant displayed a firearm,
shotgun, rifle or deadly weapon as defined in the penal law in furtherance of
such offense . . . .”).
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of the legislation in interpreting the terms);116 as well as other
various sections of New York Penal Law (further illuminating
the judicial search for definitional meaning of vague terminology
used in the RTA law) on a case-by-case basis.117
a. What are Extraordinary Circumstances in Adolescent
Offender Matters under N.Y. CPL § 722.23(1)?
The Legislature specifically contemplated that courts would
“shape and determine” the meaning of extraordinary
circumstances on a case-by-case basis while maintaining a “very
high bar” for retention of cases in the Youth Part.118 The New
York Court of Appeals has provided courts with a foundational
concept to define extraordinary circumstances: “Absent a
statutory definition [the court] must give the term its ordinary
116. People v. J.P., 95 N.Y.S.3d 731, 739 (Sup. Ct. Bronx Cty. 2019) (“In
pursuit of a determination of the ‘meaning intended by the lawmakers’
McKinney’s Statutes section 125 provides, in pertinent part, ‘If the
interpretation to be attached to a statute is doubtful, the courts may utilize
legislative proceedings to ascertain the legislative intent.’”).
117. See People v. E.B.M., 95 N.Y.S.3d 743, 745 (Cty. Ct. Nassau Cty.
2019); B.H. I, 89 N.Y.S.3d 855, 860 (Cty. Ct. Nassau Cty. 2018).
118. People v. B.H. (B.H. II), 92 N.Y.S.3d 856, 859-60 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
Cty. 2019) (quoting N.Y. State Assemb. Rec. of Proceedings, Apr. 8, 2017, at
83-85
[hereinafter
Assemb.
Proceedings],
https://nyassembly.gov/
raisetheage/transcripts/full-debate.pdf); see also E.B.M., 95 N.YS.3d at 745
(quoting Assemb. Proceedings, supra, at 21) (“[L]egislators intended that the
requirement of finding one of three factors would ensure that ‘only those cases
[of] the truly violent felons would stay in the criminal part, and those kids who
were not violent would be able to find their way to family court, where they not
only could get superior services, but would be able to get better outcomes for
their lives not only with the services that were employed, but by not receiving
a criminal record at the end of all this so that they could change their life
around.’”); People v. J.B., 94 N.Y.S. 3d 826, 829 (Cty. Ct. Westchester Cty.
2019) (citing CPL § 722.23(1)(d)) (“[T]he court must deny the motion unless it
finds that ‘extraordinary circumstances exist that should prevent the transfer
of the action to family court.’”); People v. M.M. (M.M. II), 99 N.Y.S.3d 858, 866,
868 (Cty. Ct. Nassau Cty. 2019) (quoting Assemb. Proceedings, supra, at 3738) (“[T]he question is whether the People have proved that the circumstances
in th[e] AO’s case are so exceptional and beyond what is ‘usual’ to overcome the
‘presumption where only one out of 1,000 cases those extremely rare and
exceptional cases’ would remain in the Youth Part and not be removed to the
Family Court”); People v. D.L., 90 N.Y.S.3d 866, 869 (Fam. Ct. Monroe Cty.
2018) (quoting Assemb. Proceedings, supra, at 39) (“Transfer to the family
court should be denied only when highly unusual and heinous facts are proven
and there is a strong proof that the young person is not amenable or would not
benefit in any way from the heightened services in the family court.”).
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and commonly understood meaning. . . . unless it is plain from
the statue that a different meaning is intended”119; however,
although “‘[d]ictionary definitions may be useful as guideposts
in determining the sense with which a word was used in a
statute . . . they are not controlling.’”120 Hence, the dictionary
definition of extraordinary, “exceptional to a very marked
extent,”121 or “[a] highly unusual set of facts that are not
commonly associated with a particular thing or event”122 is
merely one of many components defining “extraordinary
circumstances” in the court system.123 In addition, New York
Assembly discussions concerning the vague definition of
extraordinary circumstances contemplated several aggravating
factors that a court may consider when determining whether
extraordinary circumstances are present, including
(1) whether the AO had committed a series of
crimes over many days;
(2) whether the AO had acted in an especially
cruel and/or heinous manner; and
(3) whether the AO was a leader of the criminal
activity who had threatened or coerced other
reluctant youths into committing the crimes
before the court.124
119. J.P., 95 N.Y.S.3d at 738 (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
120. Id.; People v. T.R., No. FYC-70017-18/001, 2018 WL 7361428, at *2
(N.Y. Fam. Ct. Erie Cty. Dec. 21, 2018) (“We can conclude from its ordinary
meaning that it refers to that which is ‘very unusual’ or ‘remarkable.’ The
Court, in its discretion, should look for circumstances that go beyond what is
regular and foreseeable in the normal course of events.”).
121. M.M. II, 99 N.Y.S.3d at 864 (citing Extraordinary, MERRIAMWEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/extraordinary (last
visited Nov. 3, 2019)).
122. J.P., 95 N.Y.S.3d at 739 (citing Extraordinary, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)).
123. Id. (citing MERRIAM-WEBSTER COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed.
2009)).
124. B.H. II, 92 N.Y.S.3d 856, 859-60 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Cty. 2019)
(quoting Assemb. Proceedings, supra note 118, at 40); see People v. A.G., NoFYC-XXXXX-18-001, 2018 WL 7120259, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Queens Cty. Dec.
20, 2018) (holding that the AO’s several offenses involving robbery and grand
larceny allegedly committed while on Family Court Probation, in addition to
the AO’s numerous pending cases, constituted an extraordinary circumstance
that would warrant retention of the matter in the Youth Part and “provide a
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The Assembly also set forth a relatively comprehensive list
of mitigating factors, which include
economic difficulties faced by the AO,
substandard housing the AO may havelived in,
educational challenges experienced by the AO;
and emotional/psychological difficulties the AO
may have, such as lack of insight, susceptibility to
peer pressure due to immature [sic], the absence
of positive role models or positive behavioral role
models in the AO’s life, and abuse of alcohol or
drugs.125
The significance of both the aggravating and mitigating
factors is their satisfaction of the “circumstances” portion of the
extraordinary circumstances term, and, pragmatically, the
“context they provide for evaluating the criminal conduct
committed by the defendant . . . .”126 In addition to the above
mitigating factors, courts have explicitly considered adolescents’
inability to adequately foresee and take responsibility for the

consistent outcome for defendant’s potential rehabilitation”). But see People v.
D.P., No. FYC-70001-19, 2019 WL 1120491, at *5 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. Erie Cty. Feb.
22, 2019) (distinguishing A.G. on the facts because the AO in D.P. did not have
any pending matters before the Court, and granting removal to family court).
As for the third prong, one court has opined that “conspiring with [two] other
children is hardly extraordinary.” T.R., 2018 WL 7361428, at *2.
125. B.H. II, 92 N.Y.S.3d at 856; see J.P., 95 N.Y.S.3d at 734-43
(discussing the AO’s extensive history with Child Protective Services and the
failed efforts of various social workers over time to intervene with the
defendant’s family dynamic in a constructive way, which were typically
thwarted by defendant’s mother, from 2010 through 2018). J.P.’s mother was
his most significant adult family member in his life, but she had neglected,
rejected, and given up on him. Id. at 736. Despite this, the defendant presented
two character witnesses to testify in his favor and class certificates he earned
for class work and other activities while incarcerated since December 2018. Id.
The Court ultimately held that the case should be transferred to family court
since his “home life . . . constitute[d] a substantial contributing factor to this
now sixteen-year-old defendant’s recidivism. As such, it must be viewed as a
mitigating
circumstance
within
the
meaning
of
extraordinary
circumstances . . . .” Id. at 743.
126. Id. at 735; see B.H. II, 921 N.Y.S.3d at 860 (“The Court is persuaded
that a balancing of the factors set forth by the Legislature is the proper manner
in which to determine if extraordinary circumstances exist in a given AO
case.”).
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legal consequences of their actions.127 The inherent dichotomy
between an AOs’ inability to make choices with legal impact in
their day-to-day lives and the prosecution of AOs in the Youth
Part of adult criminal court has been highlighted by judicial
recognition of AOs’ statuses as “legal minor[s] for virtually all
purposes under New York law [who cannot] vote, sign a binding
contract, commence a lawsuit, select [their] own domicile or
legally purchase alcohol or tobacco products” when determining
whether extraordinary circumstances are present.128 To that
end, courts have also considered the punishment(s) associated
with the allegation(s) lodged against an AO as a factor of
extraordinary circumstances, in the interest of aligning an AO’s
sentence with his or her actual level of culpability and capacity
to change, which is unquestionably tied to age.129
127. See People v. D.L., 90 N.Y.S.3d 866, 871 (Fam. Ct. Monroe Cty.
2018). In holding that the AO matter should be removed to family court, where
it was alleged the AO was intentionally set a piece of furniture on fire on the
complainant’s porch, the court reasoned that the AO’s “behavior is precisely
the type of impulsive act done without thought of consequences, which is
typical of young people. Had D.L. truly intended to burn the house and harm
the inhabitants, a fire could have been set at night or in a manner where no
one was aware of her actions. Instead, D.L. rang the complainant’s door bell
and announced her plan to set a fire because she was mad, thereby allowing
the adult occupant to take action to curb her behavior.” Id.; see also T.R., 2018
WL 7361428, at *1-3 (finding that an AO’s failure to accept responsibility or
“throw himself at the mercy of the investigating officers with an expansive and
total mea culpa” for allegedly writing and delivering a note to school
administrators that read, “I’m going to bomb this school today at 12 [dated]
11/13/2018,” was “hardly irregular or unforeseeable” and that it was “very
common that a sixteen-year-old child would fabricate a story or distance
himself from involvement in a circumstance such as this”).
128. D.L., 90 N.Y.S.3d at 870-71.
129. Id. at 871 (discussing the matter of an AO charged with Attempted
Arson in the Second Degree, whose matter was removed to family court
because, among other factors, “[i]f the crime occurred just three weeks earlier,
the case would have automatically gone to Family Court . . . [and] [s]ince the
crime is not a juvenile offender offense . . . D.L. would not have been criminally
responsible for her actions and there would have been no legal possibility of
criminal prosecution”). The court there also reasoned that “[i]t [was] also
relevant to consider that if D.L.’s case remain[ed] in the Youth Part it [would
have been] adjudicated under the criminal law, which mandates incarceration
in the NYS Department of Corrections.” Id. The court in J.P. attributes this
portion of the court’s discussion in D.L. to the “growing acknowledgment in the
judicial branch as well as in the legislature, over time, that ‘children are less
culpable in the criminal context than adults and more amenable to change,’”
which is also comparable to the tenor of other judicial opinions discussing AO
removal matters. J.P., 95 N.Y.S.3d at n.5. See also B.H. II, 92 N.Y.S.3d at 857
(“In Family Court, young defendants would have better access to youth focused

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss1/9

30

488

PACE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 40.1

As evidenced by emerging decisions disposing of motions
seeking retention of AO matters in the Youth Part of adult
criminal court, judges appear to have widened the guideposts
laid by the Legislature to discern extraordinary circumstances
by weighing all of the circumstances relevant to the offense(s),
the offender, and the impact removal may have on the
community on a case-by-case basis.130 Furthermore, because the
ostensibly accepted “totality of the circumstances” approach
among New York’s courts disposing of removal motions comports
with the purpose and focus of the RTA law itself, it is not
unreasonable to expect that this approach will permeate the
courts’ decisions into the second phase of the RTA’s
implementation. However, considering the broad discretion
afforded to presiding judges, unbridled by controlling authority
outside of the RTA statute that is exactly on point as to
Adolescent Offender matters thereunder, “invariably and
necessarily, weight to be given relevant factors will vary in each
individual case that comes before the Youth Part and individual
determinations will result in conclusions upon which reasonable
people may disagree.”131
services and treatment and would be saved the onus of a criminal conviction,
but would still be subject to appropriate sanctions to hold them accountable.”);
id. at 861 (“[T]here is no evidence in the records showing that the AO is not
amenable to services”); D.P., 2019 WL 1120491, at *3 (rejecting the People’s
argument that removal to family court would “merely amount to allowing
Defendant’s criminal behavior to go without consequences,” since a parole
revocation hearing and removal to family court could lead to placement, in
addition to a likely juvenile delinquency charge in family court).
130. See B.H. II, 92 N.Y.S.3d at 861 (“[A] balancing of the factors set forth
by the Legislature is the proper manner in which to determine if extraordinary
circumstances exist in a given AO case.”); J.P., 95 N.Y.S.3d at 742 (“In applying
that definition to the extraordinary circumstances standard . . . the scope of
discretion vested in the trial court Youth Part by the legislature bears
noting. . . . [T]he pertinent sections of Criminal Procedure Law Article [§] 722
do not limit an adolescent offender’s eligibility for removal based on prior
juvenile delinquency adjudications, youthful offender adjudications, or even
prior criminal convictions, including for that matter, prior felony convictions.”);
T.R., 2018 WL 7361428, at *3 (“While it may be that Defendant’s conduct
affected thousands of innocent lives by placing them in fear and causing them
emotional harm which could perhaps be considered extraordinary
circumstances, it would be mere speculation as the Court does not have fact to
conclude that this is actually the case that rises to the level of extraordinary
circumstances.”); see also, e.g., D.L., 90 N.Y.S.3d 866; D.P., 2019 WL 1120491;
A.G., 2018 WL 7120259.
131. J.P., 95 N.Y.S.3d at 742; see J.B., 94 N.Y.S.3d at 829 (holding that
while the court “decidedly acknowledge[d] the violent nature of [the] crime and
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The case of R.M. may represent such a controversial
decision.132 There, while the court acknowledged the emotional
and violent nature of the AO’s crime, which involved the
suffocation and disembowelment of a cat, it opined that it was
“constrained by the language of the statute and the philosophy
behind it in determining the facts and circumstances . . . [did]
not rise to the level of ‘extraordinary circumstances’” to warrant
retention in the Youth Part.133 The court conceded that R.M.’s
actions amounted to the “especially depraved or sadistic
manner” contemplated by the aggravated cruelty statute under
which she was charged, yet appeared to take a subjective
approach in assessing whether extraordinary circumstances
existed.134 To that end, it explicitly considered two “major”
factors: “the nature of the criminal behavior and the defendant’s
mental health status.”135 However, the court appeared to
displace the significance of the former factor altogether by
reasoning that “without the ‘especially depraved or sadistic
manner’ of [the] crime, and the fact that the deceased cat was a
companion animal, the underlying facts would establish the
elements of . . . a class ‘A’ misdemeanor.”136 Thus, it effectively
overlooked a clear aggravating factor prescribed to determine
extraordinary circumstances, i.e. the heinous nature of the act,
in favor of the mitigating factor of the defendant’s mental health.
Furthermore, although it reasonably concluded that
the potential impact of the defendant’s alleged conduct on the community as a
whole,” i.e. that the AO was in possession of and discarded a firearm into a
garbage can while fleeing from police, it was bound to order the matter be
removed to Family Court).
132. People v. R.M., 94 N.Y.S.3d 764 (Cty. Ct. Westchester Cty. Dec. 14,
2018).
133. R.M., 94 N.Y.S.3d at 769. The cat the AO suffocated belonged to a
family friend with whom the defendant was sent to live. Id. at 765. After slicing
the cat open and removing its small and large intestines, pancreas, and spleen,
the AO kept them in a container in her room. Id.
134. Id. (“Agriculture and Markets Law § 353-a(1) defines ‘aggravated
cruelty’ as conduct that ‘(i) is intended to cause extreme physical pain; or (ii) is
done or carried out in an especially depraved or sadistic manner.’”).
135. Id. R.M.’s mental illnesses resulted in several suicide attempts and
hospitalizations. Despite this, she attended regular classes and maintained an
average in the nineties. R.M. had also, at least once, “impulsively choked and
attempted to strangulate [sic] her sister, which prompted her stay with the
family friend in question.” Id. at 766-67.
136. Id. at 769 (“The court is of the opinion that the mental health of the
defendant weighs in favor of transferring the case to Family Court, not against
it.”).
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“incarceration [was] not fitting for this defendant, but rather a
therapeutic, albeit secure, setting [was]”137 based on the AO’s
mental health history, the court simultaneously admitted that
both Family Court and the Youth Parts are capable of finding
placement for the AO through probation services.138 In light of
the court’s acquiescence that the AO’s acts were sadistic and the
AO could be placed in an appropriate facility by either court, the
denial of the district attorney’s motion, and the subsequent
removal of the matter to Family Court, appears to reflect the
growing expectation that judges will heed their own discretion
in discerning extraordinary circumstances concomitant with the
overall spirit of the RTA law.139
Furthermore, as to the comprehensive factors courts are
weighing in removal motions, there is a growing body of
divergent opinions on the issue of whether an AO’s past and/or
current involvement with the criminal justice system is
pertinent to an extraordinary circumstances determination,
even if such facts are outside of the accusatory instrument. 140
Generally, where the offense before the Youth Part marks the
AO’s first brush with the criminal justice system, i.e. is his or
her “first offense,” courts have deemed that fact a mitigating
factor and used it to underscore the appropriateness of removal
to Family Court in the spirit of the RTA.141 To that end, that
137. Id.
138. Id. (“[T]he adult setting is no more adept at finding the appropriate
placement for the adolescent and monitoring [their] progress and treatment,
two tasks that probation, available equally to Family Court as the Youth Part,
will be vital in achieving.”).
139. Cf. B.H. II, 92 N.Y.S.3d at 860-61 (granting removal of an AO matter
to family court since the Court’s balancing of factors concluded there was no
evidence tending to show aggravating circumstances nor evidence that the AO
was the one who actually stabbed the most seriously injured victim, and there
were sufficient mitigating circumstances enumerated by the Legislature and
no evidence that the AO is not amenable to services).
140. See infra notes 141-44.
141. People v. A.T. (A.T. II), 98 N.Y.S.3d 377, 380 (Fam. Ct. Erie Cty.
2019) (“[T]he Court agrees with Counsel’s interpretation of the legislative
intent to remove children and to rehabilitate those who are amenable to
services . . . .”); see People v. J.P., 95 N.Y.S.3d 731, 739 (Sup. Ct. Bronx Cty.
2019) (removed to family court); People v. L.L., FYC-700**-10-001, 2019 N.Y.
Misc. LEXIS 4277, at *13-14 (Sup. Ct. Queens Cty. July 19, 2019) (“The
behavior alleged here demonstrates the kind of poor judgment and impetuous
conduct that militates in favor of removal to the family court in order to
redirect defendant’s errant path. Moreover, since this is defendant’s first
contact with the criminal justice system, this Court does not believe that
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factor has served as an indicator of the AO’s amenability to the
services available in Family Court and a lack of “extraordinary
circumstances,” leading to an order of removal.142 Likewise,
whether an AO has pending matters before the court, or has a
criminal history has been weighed by courts determining
removal actions. In line with the “first offense” approach, when
an AO has no pending cases apart from the instant adjudication,
courts have found no extraordinary circumstances to exist and
have ordered removal of the case to family court.143 The opposite
has also proven true in that where an AO has multiple pending
cases before the Youth Part or similar courts, and appears
unamenable to services, the “extraordinary circumstances”
requirement has been met and retention in the Youth Part
ordered.144
However, at the time of this writing one court has declined
defendant presents a danger to public safety such that removal should be
denied. Rather, this matter can be effectively adjudicated in the family court
where either rehabilitation and/or detention can be imposed.”).
142. People v. J.W., No. FYC-70022-19, 2019 WL 1576074, at *2 (Fam.
Ct. Erie Cty. Mar. 28, 2019) (“Since arraignment AO has been amenable to
services. . . . [After] AO was released on own recognizance[,] AO has timely
appeared in court for all further proceedings. AO has led a law-abiding life. AO
has attended school as directed.”). Notably, J.W. was A.T.’s co-defendant in
A.T. II, and the key difference between the dispositions of their matters
evidently lied in the court’s judgment of each AO’s amenability to services. Cf.
D.P., No. FYC-70001-19, 2019 WL 1120491. But see A.T. II, 98 N.Y.S.3d at 38081 (holding “AO d[id] not appear amenable to services but rather appear[ed] to
thwart any efforts at rehabilitation” where the AO failed to comply with the
conditions of release and lead a law-abiding life, failed to report to the
probation department, and failed to appear in court for subsequent
proceedings).
143. See D.P., 2019 WL 1120491, at *7-8 (stating that, separate from the
then-pending case, consequences for the then-current alleged parole violation
could be disposed of at a parole revocation hearing, where Defendant would
face placement in the event of revocation).
144. A.G., 2018 WL 7120259, at *6-7. Here, AO had five matters in
Queens Supreme Court and Queens Criminal Court in addition to the case at
hand. The court reasoned that “[t]his could lead to the likelihood of different
and/or duplicative judicial processes and outcomes, which would not be in the
interest of justice for the community or the defendant. Moreover, a global
disposition of all matters in the Youth Part would provide a consistent outcome
for defendant’s potential rehabilitation.” Id.; accord A.T. II, 98 N.Y.S.3d at 381
(“As set forth in the People’s moving papers, committing a violent felony
offense while at liberty on another pending charge, and the subsequent failure
to appear although provided notice to do so is remarkable. Additionally, the
Court must consider the third felony charge filed against AO, albeit after the
filing of this motion, since that charge was filed prior to the hearing.”).
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to engage in such an analysis as outside of the judiciary’s
purview pursuant to a relevant statute.145 In People v. M.M., the
Court “[wa]s not persuaded to rely on the AO’s juvenile
delinquency records” although it was “mindful” of a sister court’s
decision, i.e. the J.P. Court’s decision.146 It outlined the following
reasons for its departure from the J.P. court’s reasoning:
First, because the court in J.P. did not
address [N.Y. Family Court Act (“FCA”)]
§ 381.2[1] in its decision, it is possible that the
Bronx court was not aware of FCA § 381.2[1]’s
prohibition against the use of juvenile
delinquency records.147 Second, this Court,
respectfully, is not bound by the decision of a
justice of coordinate jurisdiction (citations
omitted). Finally, this Court notes that even after
taking into consideration the AO’s juvenile
delinquency history, the court in J.P. nonetheless
found that the People had failed to demonstrate
“extraordinary circumstances” and ordered that
the AO’s case be removed to the Family Court. If
the fact that an individual was previously
adjudicated a juvenile delinquent is to be
considered in assessing factors against him with
respect to the potential removal of a case from the
Youth Part to the Family Court, then such
consideration must be specifically authorized by
the Legislature, not by this Court (citations
omitted).148
Given that courts are looking to statutes and other
145. See M.M. II, 99 N.Y.S.3d 858, 866 (Cty. Ct. Nassau Cty. 2019).
146. Id.; see supra notes 126-27, 130-32. See generally People v. J.P., 95
N.Y.S.3d 731 (Sup. Ct. Bronx Cty. 2019).
147. M.M. II, 99 N.Y.S.3d at 865 (“[T]he Court of Appeals cited to FCA
§ 381.2[1] for the proposition that ‘[a]s a rule, a juvenile delinquency
adjudication cannot be used against the juvenile in any other court for any
other purpose.’ The rationale behind FCA § 381.2 is that ‘[d]elinquency
proceedings are designed not just to punish the malefactor but also to
extinguish the causes of juvenile delinquency through rehabilitation and
treatment.’” (citations omitted)).
148. Id. at 866–67.
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authority to clarify and cultivate the significance of the
extraordinary circumstances term, it is not unexpected that
courts, like that in M.M., turned to the Family Court Act for
guidance on this issue, even if such an approach diverges from
those of other courts and judges. However, the M.M. court’s
unprecedented149 approach in light of other reported AO cases
discussed herein begs the question whether the discretion
afforded judges to hone the RTA law’s definition of extraordinary
circumstances will effectuate inconsistencies in the
administration of the RTA law from the outset, and therefore
create another source of unpredictability for AOs in the juvenile
justice system.
As the state edges forward in the
implementation of the RTA legislation for New York’s
seventeen-year-old AOs, it will be interesting to see whether
tilting the scale towards removing ostensibly non-violent and/or
violent felony cases into family court based upon an inclusive
definition of extraordinary circumstances, like the approach
taken in R.M.,150 or an exclusive approach, similar to that taken
in M.M.,151 will better achieve the goals of the RTA legislation,
which seeks to rehabilitate all juvenile offenders in a consistent
manner while respecting the traditional underpinnings of the
criminal justice system.
b. Defining Significant Physical Injury under N.Y. CPL
§ 722.23(2)(c)(i)
Unlike the State Assembly’s anticipatory commentary
delineating how courts may interpret extraordinary
circumstances on an ad hoc basis, its discussions surrounding
the definition of significant physical injury have been less
enlightening, perhaps due to the fact that “the Legislature
specifically contemplated, at least with regard to the definition
of significant physical injury, that the Courts would fill the void
left by the Legislature.”152 Despite the lack of guidance from the
149. At the time of this writing, and as to the reported cases only.
150. See People v. R.M., 94 N.Y.S.3d 764 (Cty. Ct. Westchester Cty. Dec.
14, 2018).
151. See M.M. I, 97 N.Y.S.3d 426 (Cty. Ct. Nassau Cty. Mar. 21, 2019).
152. B.H. I, 89 N.Y.S.3d 855, 859 (Cty. Ct. Nassau Cty. 2018) (citing
Assemb. Proceedings, supra note 118) (“Considering the absence of clear
guidance from the Legislature, the Court has looked to existing case law to
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Legislature, courts have gradually defined significant physical
injury in the context of adolescent matters on a case-by-case
basis using their broad discretion under the statute.
As expected, some physical injuries are easily recognized as
significant by the courts, while others are more difficult to
capture under the terminology. For instance, since “it would
defy logic to argue that causing the death of a person was not
the serious criminal conduct contemplated by the legislature to
warrant retention of [a] criminal case by the Youth Part,” the
injury of death is certainly a significant physical injury as
required under CPL § 722.23(2)(i).153
Exclusive of lethal
injuries, a prevailing “working definition” of significant physical
injuries has emerged.154 In its debate prior to the passage of the
RTA legislation, the State Assembly referenced that significant
physical injury would involve “bone fractures, injuries requiring
surgery, and injuries resulting in disfigurement.”155 Some
courts have opined that such injuries fall within the definition
of significant physical injuries because they arise from the use
of a weapon,156 while others have used the allegation of the use
of a weapon only to reinforce a conclusion that a significant

define these terms.”); see also People v. A.S., No. FYC-70002-19/001, 2019 WL
722905, at *2 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. Erie Cty. Jan. 15, 2019) (“RTA does not define
significant physical injury. Thus, significant physical injury must be
determined on a case by case basis.”).
153. People v. G.C., 94 N.Y.S.3d 795, 798 (Cty. Ct. Westchester Cty. Feb.
7, 2019).
154. See B.H. I, 89 N.Y.S.3d at 860; A.S., 2019 WL 722905; People v.
E.B.M., 95 N.Y.S.3d 743 (Cty. Ct. Nassau Cty. 2019).
155. B.H. I, 89 N.Y.S.3d (quoting Assemb. Proceedings, supra note 118,
at 26, 29); accord A.S., 2019 WL 722905, at *2 (reasoning that legislative
history also suggests that significant physical injury would be “more serious
than a bruise”); E.B.M., 2019 WL 1052201, at *4. However, the Assembly
Record of Proceedings makes clear such aggravating facts may exist alone, e.g.,
“a bone fracture need not require surgery to be considered an aggravating
factor” in the determination of whether significant physical injury exists.
People v. Y.L., 104 N.Y.S.3d 839, 842 (Cty. Ct. Monroe Cty. 2019) (citing
Assemb. Proceedings, supra note 118).
156. B.H. I, 89 N.Y.S.3d at 860-61 (holding that significant physical
injury existed where the complainant’s injury arose from the AO’s adult codefendant’s use of weapons, including, a golf club carried by the AO, a long
stick, a baseball bat, and a hammer). The Court also held the AO did not
possess or display a deadly weapon, but found the victim suffered significant
physical injury nonetheless. Id. at 861. The Court in B.H. I made mention of
weapons that would cause significant physical injury to include: a firearm,
samurai sword, or belt. Id.
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physical injury is present from other alleged facts.157 Yet, the
use of a weapon is not necessary to support a finding that an AO
caused significant physical injury as contemplated by the
statute.158
Furthermore, although the Legislature suggested that a
definition of significant physical injury could be ascertained by
a comparison to the standard for injury in no-fault insurance law
cases, which necessitates a permanent injury,159 this standard
has been rejected as “too stringent for the criminal law
context.”160 In other words, the fact that a victim may fully
recover from an injury or not suffer any permanent effect
therefrom does not preclude a finding of significant physical
injury and assigning criminal liability accordingly.161 The
prevailing definition, inclusive of the aforementioned factors,
has placed “significant physical injury” between “physical
injury” as defined by New York Penal Law § 10.00(9),
“impairment of a physical condition or substantial pain,” and

157. A.S., 2019 WL 722905, at *2-3 (holding that the allegation of the use
of a firearm in causing the complainant to suffer lacerations to his head which
required staples to close the wound and suffer a broken wrist would clearly fall
within the meaning of significant physical injury, even though a firearm was
not uncovered during the investigation). But see People v. L.L., FYC-700**-10001, 2019 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4277, at *3, 12 (Sup. Ct. Queens Cty. July 19,
2019) (failing to discuss staples victim had put in to close head laceration
incurred as a result of the AO’s alleged use of force and a B.B. gun, which AO
admitted to possessing, after court found AO did not “display [a weapon] in
furtherance of such offense”).
158. E.B.M., 95 N.Y.S.3d at 745-46, 749 (holding that each AO codefendant, while acting in concert with their adult co-defendants and others,
to rob one victim caused significant physical injury when they punched, kicked,
and stomped the victim in the face numerous times causing him to sustain a
fractured nose, fractured orbital bone, a concussion, and swelling to the eyes
and face); Y.L., 104 N.Y.S.3d at 841-42 (finding significant physical injury
where the victim sustained “a nasal bone fracture, associated soft tissues [sic]
swelling, and frontal scalp swelling” and required several days’ hospitalization
after the AO co-defendants taunted, punched, and kicked him repeatedly in
the head).
159. B.H. I, 89 N.Y.S.3d at 861 (“Serious physical injuries are found, in
no-fault cases, in two circumstances. The first is where an individual suffers
the ‘permanent consequential limitation of use of a body organ or member.’ The
second is where an individual suffers the ‘significant limitation of use of a body
function or system.’”).
160. Id.
161. Id. (holding that despite complainant’s recovery from being stabbed
six times and hit in the head with a baseball bat, and the ensuing facial
paralysis, the injuries constituted significant physical injuries).
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New York Penal Law § 10.00(10), “physical injury which creates
a substantial risk of death or which causes death or serious and
protracted disfigurement, . . . impairment of health or
protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily
organ.”162 It appears that positioning the meaning of the
“significant physical injury” term between these provisions of
the Penal Code, along with the other circumstances mentioned
above, will afford courts a narrow breadth in which to exercise
their discretion to interpret a clear, consistent rule to find
“significant physical injury” in future AO cases, including those
involving seventeen-year-old AOs as of October 1, 2019.
Moreover, it is unequivocal that, pursuant to the RTA
statute, a determination that the AO caused the significant
physical injury during the alleged commission of a violent felony
is required under this prong of the three-part test, a
consideration which has especially come to the fore in cases
where the AO allegedly acted in concert with other offenders.163
That is not to say, however, that courts agree that the AO must
have been the “sole” actor in causing such injury164: at least one
162. A.S., 2019 WL 722905, at *2; see N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(9), (10)
(McKinney through L.2019 ch. 652); see also B.H. I, 89 N.Y.S.3d at 861; E.B.M.,
95 N.Y.S.3d at 747-48.
163. N.Y. CPL § 722.23(2)(c)(i) (McKinney through L.2019 ch. 652).
164. Interestingly, the same portions of the New York Assembly Records
memorializing the debate on the RTA legislation, specifically accomplice
liability, have been cited by courts on opposite sides of the issue of causation of
a victim’s alleged significant physical injury. Compare Y.L., 104 N.Y.S.3d at
842-43, n.5 (citing Assemb. Proceedings, supra note 118, at 51-52, as basis for
holding that AO need not be “sole actor”), with B.H. II, 92 N.Y.S.3d 856, 861
(Sup. Ct. Nassau Cty. 2019) (quoting Assemb. Proceedings, supra note 118, at
51) (“[T]he Assembly’s main sponsor of the Bill states that the three factor test
‘required the defendant to be the sole actor who causes the conduct outlined. . .
. The Legislative history states that this is consistent with the spirit of the law
because ‘kids happen to get in trouble together all the time’ and the Assembly
did not want to punish an entire group for ‘one bad apple.’”). The relevant
portion of the Assembly Record of Proceedings reads as follows:
[Assemblyperson] Quart: . . . [“W]ould [the three-part] test
also disqualify those [AO defendants from removal] who are
just present or nearby during the alleged offense or
occurrence?”
[Assemblyperson] Lentol: “No. This test requires that the
defendant be the sole actor [sic] who causes the conduct
outlined in the test. Again . . . you can understand why we
want to do that, because kids happen to get in trouble
together all the time and may – it may be just the one guy
that really is the bad one – bad apple in the group, and we
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court has held that “causation should not be so narrowly defined
as requiring a ‘sole’ actor,”165 while other courts have given
ample weight to this factor in determining removal actions.166
Unlike the definition of significant physical injury, the
incongruous levels of significance that courts have given to the
causation portion of the significant physical injury prong
suggests that there will, nonetheless, be inconsistent outcomes
throughout the state on this issue as the state moves forward
with implementing the RTA law for seventeen-year-olds.
Additionally, these expected inconsistencies further clarify that
the Legislature’s decision—to accord judges presiding over AO
matters broad discretion to shape the terms of the statute—may
certainly lead to uneven application of the RTA law throughout
New York.
c. Interpreting Displayed in Furtherance of an Offense in
Adolescent Offender Matters under N.Y. CPL
§ 722.23(2)(c)(ii)
At the time of this writing, the meaning of the term
displayed under the second prong of the three-factor test, which
automatically retains an AO matter in the Youth Part, has been
substantially fleshed out by the courts.167
One opinion
don’t want to punish all of them. It would also disqualify the
[AO] defendant who directly caused the injury, who displayed
the weapon in his or [her] [own] hand, and who personally
engaged in the unlawful sexual conduct.”
Assemb. Proceedings, supra note 118, at 51-52. The disparity between these
opinions highlights the inconsistency in reasoning and dispositions of AO
matters due, at least partially, to the discretion imparted to judges presiding
over RTA cases.
165. Y.L., 104 N.Y.S.3d at 842-43 (distinguishing Y.L.’s facts from those
in J.M., where the court reasoned the Legislature intended that the defendant
be the sole actor).
166. B.H. II, 92 N.Y.S.3d at 861 (ordering removal of the matter to family
court because, inter alia, there was no evidence in the record that the AO was
the sole actor); cf. A.S., 2019 WL 722905, at *2 (holding retention warranted
where AO co-defendants “together struck the complainant in the head with a
‘black pistol’ causing complainant to suffer” significant physical injury
(emphasis added)); E.B.M., 95 N.Y.S.3d at 749 (holding retention in Youth Part
was warranted because the State established by a preponderance of the
evidence that “each AO co-defendant was personally responsible for directly
causing Victim #1’s ‘significant physical injuries’” (emphasis added)).
167. See N.Y. CPL § 722.23(2)(c)(ii) (McKinney through L.2019 ch. 652)
(“the defendant displayed a firearm, shotgun, rifle or deadly weapon as defined
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encompassing the evidently accepted definition of “display” in
the context of the RTA legislation derives from a decision after
the AO’s sixth-day hearing in the case of People v. M.M., where
the Court ascertained the legislative intent and construed the
pertinent statutes to effectuate that intent168 by turning to the
plain meaning of the word “display”169 before determining that
the statute requires that the People must prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the AO showed or “exhibited
ostentatiously an actual firearm or deadly weapon as defined in
the [P]enal [L]aw.”170 Citing Legislative intent, the M.M. Court
held it would be “illogical for [it] to construe CPL
§ 722.23(2)(c)(ii) in a way that expands the reach of the provision
to cases that would otherwise proceed toward automatic removal
to the Family Court under CPL § 722.23(1)(a).”171 Moreover,
generally, the argument proffered by prosecutors that “what the
victim perceives to be a firearm, including situations where the
AO’s words or actions suggest it is a firearm,”172 should be
included under “displayed” has been rejected by Youth Parts,
since “[n]othing in the plain language of the statute indicates
that CPL § 722.23(2)(c)(ii) is intended to extend cases where the

in the penal law in furtherance of the offense.”).
168. M.M. I, 97 N.Y.S.3d 426 (Cty. Ct. Nassau Cty. Mar. 21, 2019). As of
this decision, M.M. was charged by way of three felony complaints, two of
which respectively charged M.M. with one count of Robbery in the First
Degree, a class B felony, and the remaining complaint charging M.M. with
Robbery in the Third Degree for a total of two class B felonies and one class D
felony lodged against the AO. Id. at 427. M.M. was later charged by way of a
fourth felony company with one count of Robbery in the First Degree. M.M. II,
99 N.Y.S.3d 858, 860 (Cty. Ct. Nassau Cty. 2019).
169. M.M. I, 97 N.Y.S.3d at 432; People v. D.G., No. FYC-70228-19, 2019
WL 2455461, at *11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Cty. Apr. 4, 2019) (“[A]s a noun, the
word ‘display’ means a setting or presentation of something in open view . . . .
As a verb, it means[] to disport, exhibit, expose, flash, flaunt, lay out, parade,
produce, show, show off, sport, strut, and unveil.”).
170. M.M. I, 97 N.Y.S.3d at 432 (emphasis added).
171. Id.; accord D.G., 2019 WL 2455461, at *12.
172. M.M. I, 97 N.Y.S.3d at 429; People v. W.H., 2019 NYLJ LEXIS 2981,
at *8-9 (Sup. Ct. Queens Cty. Aug. 19, 2019) (“[U]nlike the Penal Law inclusive
language allowing prosecution for Robbery in the first degree for ‘what appears
to be a firearm . . . or deadly weapon,’ the legislature under CPL
§ 722.23(2)(c)(ii) uses unequivocal language requiring an actual ‘display of a
firearm or deadly weapon’ to avoid removal.”). The Court in D.G. similarly
stated that the Legislature intended that this definition required “something
more than to merely ‘display what appears to be a firearm or deadly weapon.’”
2019 WL 2455461, at *11.
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AO has not displayed an actual firearm . . . “173
Thus, growing case law reveals that satisfaction of the prong
that the AO “display” a firearm in furtherance of the alleged
violent offense requires the accusatory instrument to sufficiently
plead that the AO displayed an actual firearm, shotgun, rifle, or
other deadly weapon,174 which would be bolstered by the
recovery of such a weapon,175 evidence the complainant
sustained injuries that match that which would be caused by a
weapon,176 and/or other evidence or circumstances pertinent to
the determination, including, but not limited to: eyewitness(es),
clothing which tests positive for gunshot primer residue,177 et
cetera. It is not untenable that the prevailing interpretation of
the term displayed will be sustained in future decisions
throughout the state as it preserves the courts’ common trend

173. M.M. I, 97 N.Y.S.3d at 430; See also D.G., 2019 WL 2455461, at *4
(holding People did not meet their burden to prove that the object displayed
was in fact, an actual firearm and ordering removal of the matter to family
court); W.H., 2019 NYLJ LEXIS 2981, at *11-12 (holding retention in Youth
Part appropriate where the People met burden and AO did not challenge or
provide proof to contradict the alleged display of a loaded silver twenty-five
caliber semi-automatic pistol).
174. For example, a B.B. gun is a “deadly weapon” as defined by N.Y.
Penal Law section 10.00(12). People v. A.T. (A.T. I), 94 N.Y.S.3d 431, 432 (Fam.
Ct. Erie Cty. 2019). But see A.T. II, 98 N.Y.S.3d 377, 378-79 (Fam. Ct. Erie Cty.
2019) (court previously held People failed to meet the requirements of CPL
§ 722.23(2)(c) where the same AO, along with co-defendants, in the course of
the commission of the alleged crime did place a screwdriver at the back of the
complainant’s head and threaten immediate use thereof).
175. See A.T. I, 94 N.Y.S.3d at 432 (holding that retention of the matter
in the Youth Part was warranted since the AO used or threatened the use of
physical force and actually displayed a black and silver BB gun while allegedly
committing a robbery, which was recovered); W.H., 2019 NYLJ LEXIS 2981,
at *11-12 (twenty-five caliber semi-automatic pistol was recovered); see also
People v. L.L., FYC-700**-10-001, 2019 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4277, at *12-13 (Sup.
Ct. Queens Cty. July 19, 2019) (removed to family court because, inter alia, no
gun recovered). But see D.G., 2019 WL 2455461, at *13 (“And although this
Court is not holding that a firearm must be recovered and or discharged in
order for the People to meet their burden . . . the People’s mere recitation of
the facts as outlined in the complaint, and bald assertions that the
Complainant perceived what she believed to be a black colored firearm, at
night, standing alone, falls woefully short of the Legislative intent.”).
176. L.M., 2019 WL 1187308, at *4 (holding that case should remain in
the Youth Part the AO possessed and fired five shots from a loaded pistol, of
which one shot struck the complaining witness and became lodged in their
abdomen); People v. G.C., 94 N.Y.S.3d 795, 798 (Cty. Ct. Westchester Cty. Feb.
7, 2019) (autopsy report stated death was caused by a bullet wound).
177. See id.
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toward effectuating the progressive legislative intent of the RTA
legislation and its presumption of removal to family court.
However, it is worth noting that proof that the AO did, in
fact, display an actual weapon may not sustain the burden of
proof to retain the AO matter in the Youth Part automatically,
according to growing case law. There remains the issue relative
to the second half of the CPL § 722.23(2)(c)(ii)—whether the AO
displayed said weapon “in furtherance of the offense” alleged. At
the time of this writing, there is only one reported decision
explicitly discussing the “in furtherance of the offense” piece of
this prong of the three-part test, People v. N.C. (No. 70335-2019,
2019 WL 5199478 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Bronx Cty. Oct. 4, 2019)).178
There, despite finding that the prosecution did establish that the
AO brandished an actual, operable firearm during the incident
in question and that a firearm was recovered which matched the
shell casings of bullets fired, the Court nevertheless found that
the People failed to prove that the AO displayed the firearm in
furtherance of either of the violent felonies the AO was charged
with and ordered the case be removed to family court.179 It
reasoned that “[r]equiring that the People prove that an
adolescent’s display of a firearm was done in order to ‘advance
or promote’ the underlying felony with which the adolescent is
charged ensures that all but the most serious cases are in fact
subject to the automatic removal provisions of the ‘Raise the Age’
statute,”180 in line with the intent of the RTA law.
Yet, the N.C. Court’s reasoning effectuated a result that
does not exactly comport with prior decisions of sister courts
disposing of AO matters in the context of CPL § 722.23(2)(c)(ii).
Specifically, as to the charge of Attempted Criminal Possession
178. In People v. N.C., No. 70335-2019, 2019 WL 5199478 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Bronx Cty. Oct. 4, 2019), the AO was charged with Attempted Murder in the
Second Degree (and related charges) and with Attempted Criminal Possession
of a Weapon in the Second Degree (and related charges) in connection with an
incident where the AO allegedly (a) made a hand-to-hand exchange with an
unapprehended individual who had just displayed a .380 caliber, semiautomatic pistol, and fired approximately seven shots in the direction of an
individual who was shot twice; (b) removed a .380 caliber pistol from his shorts
pocket and pointed it in the direction of an unknown individual before cocking
the pistol’s hammer; and (c) held the pistol, ran behind a marked police car,
and abandoned the pistol there, where it would be recovered by police. Id. at
*2-5.
179. Id. at *10-12.
180. Id. at *10-11.
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of a Weapon, the N.C. Court expressed doubt regarding “how
pointing the firearm furthered the defendant’s attempted
possession of a loaded and operable firearm,” and rejected the
implication of the People’s argument, that “whenever an
adolescent displays a firearm, he or she [must be] ‘furthering’
the commission of the crime of Criminal Possession of a Weapon
or Attempted Criminal Possession of a Weapon.”181 It reasoned
that accepting such a position “would deprive the words, ‘in
furtherance of,’ of any meaning or effect, as all cases in which an
adolescent displayed a firearm would fall within [CPL
§ 722.23(2)(c)(ii)].”182 Conversely, the Court in W.H. previously
held that the defendant there indeed displayed a firearm in
furtherance of essentially the same offense N.C. was charged
with—criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree.183
Moreover, according to the published decision, W.H. did not even
point the gun at someone, it was recovered from inside his jacket
by a police officer upon his arrest after the officer observed W.H.
to have “possessed a shiny silver object, which defendant tried
to conceal in his jacket as he ran from the [officer].”184 These
disparate cases offer a thought-provoking comparison, since
after all, if examining an unlawful possession of a firearm
charge, actual possession of such a firearm does not fall under
the “in furtherance of” term, then what does?
Although it is expected that courts will differ in their
decisions under the RTA law, given the vast discretion afforded
Youth Part judges who must give meaning to vague, undefined
terms like displayed and in furtherance of, inconsistent
interpretations of all of the ambiguous terms in the legislation
may lead to unequal, uncertain results in a juvenile justice
system that is in the process of being overhauled in and outside
of court.
V. Remedying the Defects in the Sealing & Removal
181. Id. at *11-12.
182. Id. at *12.
183. People v. W.H., 2019 NYLJ LEXIS 2981, at *11 (Sup. Ct. Queens
Cty. Aug. 19, 2019). As discussed supra, see note 178, N.C. was charged with
Attempted Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Second Degree. N.C., 2019
WL 5199478 at *1-2; see also W.H., 2019 NYLJ LEXIS 2981, at *2, *11
(defendant was charged with two counts of Criminal Possession of a Weapon
in the Second Degree).
184. Id. at *11.
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Provisions of the Raise the Age Law Going Forward
Although the Raise the Age legislation’s progressive
orientation has been viewed as a triumph of the juvenile
criminal justice system by some, critics have suggested that the
law is incomplete, or “half a loaf,” resulting in the challenges for
courts, as discussed above, and other facets of New York’s
criminal justice system.185 In light of the emerging defects of the
law and judicial opinions reaching out to the Legislature for
remedies to the RTA provisions since their enactment, future
changes in the landscape of the juvenile justice system under the
RTA legislation is vital. In the following subsections, this article
will highlight a few proposals that may remedy the defects in the
law and assuage the concerns of critics and courts alike.
A. The Judiciary’s Call for Amendments to the Raise the
Age Law’s Sealing Provision & the Legislature’s
Forthcoming Response
Because the RTA legislation is currently being administered
by the courts, opinions discussing the sealing provision have
shed light upon grey areas of the law that can be tailored to
better suit the goals of the progressive law. Judge Joseph A.
Zayas of the Supreme Court of Queens County has opined that
there are “several reasons to question the wisdom of [the]
categorial approach to sealing eligibility,” including, producing
seemingly inequitable outcomes, and failing to explicitly address
criminal records of younger offenders, even though the sealing
statute that was enacted as part of the RTA legislation is overtly
geared toward those offenders.186 He illustrated this inequity
through the description of a case where because a defendant
pleaded to a lesser charge he was able to seal his robbery
conviction “which was violent by any reasonable definition of the
word,” in stark contrast with the results of Jane Doe and John
Doe, discussed in Part II(ii), supra.187 Judge Zayas called upon
185. Hager, supra note 49 (quoting State Sen. Kevin Parker of Brooklyn).
186. People v. Jane Doe, 89 N.Y.S.3d 594, 597-98 (Sup. Ct. Queens Cty.
2018).
187. Id. See Andrew Denny, Queens Judge to Lawmakers: “Raise the Age”
Sealing
Law
Needs
More
Work,
N.Y.L.J.
(Dec.
12,
2018),
http://raisetheageny.com/newitem/queens-judge-lawmakers-raise-age-sealing-
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the Legislature to revise the sealing statute to ameliorate
troublesome outcomes like that in Jane Doe, since the disparities
it produces can be the product of factors beyond the defendant’s
control, such as the prosecution’s discretion in offering plea
bargains and the trial judge’s discretion to resolve a case by
deeming the defendant a Youthful Offender.188 His suggestions
to amend the RTA law include
[e]xpand[ing] sealing eligibility to convictions of
violent felony offenses that were committed when
the defendant was younger than nineteen,
provided that, at the time of conviction, the
defendant was eligible to be adjudicated as a
youthful offender. Because sealing eligibility in
New York is relatively strict, there would [be]
little risk that a truly violent, antisocial person
would be eligible for relief.189
Assemblywoman Aravella Simotas has answered the
Queens Supreme Court’s calls to amend the RTA legislation, at
least in part, by announcing her plan to propose a bill that would
expand the sealing provision by allowing individuals to apply for
their records to be sealed if they were eligible to be treated as a
Youthful Offender in the past, but were denied that status,
clearly alluding to the compelling case of Jane Doe.190 Because
of the discretionary nature of the designation of Youthful
Offender status, which is determined at sentencing and would
allow for automatic sealing of the Youthful Offender’s records,
law-needs-work (“The judge said he recently granted a sealing application in
another case in which the defendant was [nineteen] when he and an accomplice
allegedly committed a robbery in which they assaulted the victim, but who
later pleaded guilty to third-degree robbery, an eligible offense under the
sealing statute.”).
188. Jane Doe, 89 N.Y.S.3d at 597.
189. Id. at 599.
190. Dan M. Clark, Lawmaker Proposes Bill to Expand Protections in
‘Raise the Age’ Law, N.Y.L.J. (Jan. 31, 2019, 6:00 AM),
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2019/01/31/lawmaker-proposes-billto-expand-protections-in-nys-raise-the-age-law/ (“Youthful offender status has
been available to defendants as young as 16 years old but younger than 19
years old in New York since 1971, when the Legislature passed a bill creating
the classification. Certain violent or serious crimes may prevent that person
from being classified as a youthful offender.”).
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state lawmaker Simotas’ proposal would address the disparity
identified by the court in Jane Doe to effectuate sealing of
criminal records not only for future AOs, but also retroactively
for movants with convictions that are more likely to have met
the ten-year conviction-free requirement to be eligible for
sealing. Simotas’ anticipated bill obliges defendants to meet the
same requirements as AOs to be eligible for sealing, affording all
juvenile offenders eligibility proportionate to that of offenders
falling under the newly enacted law and giving “people who
committed crimes in their youth the chance to become full
members of society in adulthood [by] grant[ing them] the chance
to move beyond the burden of a criminal record.”191 Moreover,
lawmakers in Albany have discussed shortening the ten-year
period defendants seeking to seal their record must wait before
applying in order to afford younger defendants more
opportunities in the job market at an earlier age.192,193
B. Proposal for Clarification of the Ambiguous Terminology
in the Raise the Age Legislation
In order to avoid contravening the rehabilitative and
forward-looking goals of the RTA law, the Legislature should set
forth explicit explanations to confirm the definitions created by
the courts on a case-by-case basis, perhaps in the form of
Legislative commentary to the RTA legislation itself or outright
amendments to the law. Not only will this clear up the
amorphous definitions of the terminology which is intrinsic to
the administration of the RTA’s provision with regard to AOs,
but it will aid in providing an objective rule to a wide range of
circumstances that begin in the already unfamiliar setting of the
191. Id. (quoting Assemb. Aravella Simotas).
192. Id. At the time of writing, these discussions appear to be ongoing.
193. Additionally, New York’s Youthful Offender law provides the
opportunity for youth under the age of nineteen to have a criminal conviction
set aside and replaced with a confidential, non-criminal outcome, and to have
reduced prison sentences; however, these protections are no longer available
once a youth reaches the age of nineteen. See Agenda for Achieving Youth
Justice, supra note 67, at 2. Organizations and leaders throughout the state
are working toward strengthening existing protections under the Youthful
Offender law to create a new “Young Adult Status,” which would cover young
adults up to the age of twenty-five, shielding them from incurring lifelong
criminal records that create barriers to education, jobs, and housing for
youthful mistakes. Id.
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Youth Parts of adult criminal courts.194 Furthermore, issuing
commentary to the RTA law would be feasible in light of the
resources and mechanisms available to the Legislature
including criminal and family court advisory committees which
provide a forum that possesses the necessary acumen for
effective discussions to discover and implement resolutions of
pertinent issues.195
VI. After-Thoughts
It is incontrovertible that in its first year, the RTA
legislation has been regarded as a resounding success for New
York’s juvenile justice system.196 As of October 1, 2019, New
York no longer treats juveniles under the age of eighteen-yearsold as adults in the state criminal system automatically,
completing the state’s timeline for the complete transition under
the RTA legislation.197 Although it has been noted that New
194. One court’s approach to remedying inconsistent outcomes combined
the dictionary definition of extraordinary in conjunction with all other factors
“in the interest of applying an objective defined standard to a fluid set of
circumstances,” People v. J.P., 95 N.Y.S.3d 731, 742 (Sup. Ct. Bronx Cty. 2019);
however, it is not guaranteed that all courts will employ the same logic.
195. See generally N.Y. State Unified Court Sys., Judiciary’s Legislative
Reform:
Advisory
Committee
Reports
Archive,
N.Y.
COURTS,
http://ww2.nycourts.gov/ip/judiciaryslegislative/archive.shtml (last visited
Nov. 1, 2019). The most recent Report of the Advisory Committee on Criminal
Law and Procedure reveals the Committee has already called for clarification
of a portion of the sealing law under CPL sections 160.58, 160.59. See generally
N.Y. ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIM. LAW AND PROC., REPORT OF THE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE TO THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE
JUDGE OF THE COURTS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (2019),
https://www.nycourts.gov/LegacyPDFS/IP/judiciaryslegislative/pdfs/2019CriminalLaw.pdf.
196. See, e.g., Devon Magliozzi, Early Progress of Cuomo’s Youth Justice
Overhaul Looks Positive, ITHACA VOICE (Sept. 27, 2019), https://
ithacavoice.com/2019/09/raise-the-age-early-progress-of-cuomos-youth-justiceoverhaul-looks-positive/; Devon Magliozzi, New York’s Raise The Age Overhaul
Wins Early Praise, CRIME REP., https://thecrimereport.org/2019/09/24/
youth-justice-overhaul-in-new-york-state-wins-early-praise/ (Sept. 24, 2019);
see generally Updates: News, RAISE THE AGE NY, https://raisetheageny.org/
category/news/ (last visited Dec. 30, 2019).
197. Governor Cuomo Announces Second Phase of Raise the Age Law Now
in Effect, N.Y. STATE: GOVERNOR ANDREW M. CUOMO (Oct. 1, 2019)
https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-announces-second-phaseraise-age-law-now-effect; see Agenda for Achieving Youth Justice, supra note
67, at 2.
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York’s RTA “comes amid an already rapidly shrinking justice
system,”198 the statistics gathered since its implementation for
sixteen-year-old offenders underscore the overall success of the
legislation thus far. The Mayor’s Office of Criminal Justice has
reported that: “[b]uilding on this success [of the shrinking justice
system], the first nine months under the new law saw
misdemeanor arrests of sixteen-year-olds decline sixty-one
percent compared to the same time period from October 2017 to
June 2018.”199 Furthermore, during the first year since RTA
law’s enactment, nearly eighty percent of sixteen-year-old AOs
have been arraigned in the Youth Part and removed to Family
Court, in line with the general intent of the Legislation.200
Specifically, as to the period from October 2019 to March 2019,
eighty-two percent of such cases were removed to Family Court
or Probation according to a report issued in August 2019 by the
State’s RTA Task Force, which oversees the law’s
implementation.201 Furthermore, over the past two years, it has
been reported that more than 1,000 individuals have taken
advantage of the sealing provisions of the RTA law, according to
the State, proving that the law’s rehabilitative focus is taking
effect.202
Nevertheless, as the implementation and execution of the
RTA legislation forges onward, there remain issues to be
cognizant of in order to ensure the intent behind the law is
effectively realized.203 One issue which has been recognized by
198. City of N.Y., supra note 51.
199. Id.
200. See id.
201. Dan M. Clark, NY Courts Ready as Second Phase of ‘Raise the Age’
Law Takes Effect, Officials Say, N.Y.L.J. (Oct. 1, 2019 12:27 PM),
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2019/10/01/ny-courts-ready-assecond-phase-of-raise-the-age-law-takes-effect-officials-say/.
202. Id.
203. As mentioned previously, supra note 1, this Article would not do
justice to discussing other issues surrounding the implementation of the Raise
the Age legislation that would be more fully disposed of in another law review
article. However, as to the housing and facilities issues under the RTA, it is
praiseworthy that with the decline in arrests of those under the age of
eighteen-years-old, “New York’s approach to youth justice and its
simultaneous sharp drops in both youth incarceration and youth crime, call
into question the need for youth prisons that dominate so much of youth justice
landscape throughout the rest of the country.” City of N.Y., supra note 51
(quoting Vincent Schiraldi, former Commissioner of N.Y.C. Probation and coDirector of the Columbia University Justice Lab). As such, it is not untenable
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those overseeing the execution of the RTA, for instance, is
whether there will be accessible magistrates to hear AO matters
in a timely manner as is required under the statute. Deputy
Administrative Judge Edwina Mendelson, who leads the Office
for Justice Initiatives in the Office of Court Administration, has
made assurances that the state’s family courts are ready for the
processing of seventeen-year-old AOs as the second phase of the
RTA is implemented, and that she does not foresee that courts
will be unable to successfully absorb AO cases accordingly with
currently available resources, including jurists.204 However, to
the extent such issues will come to fruition in connection with
the anticipated influx of seventeen-year-old AOs,205 they are
preemptively being curtailed by changes in court operations
which undercut the need for additional accessible magistrates,
such as the creation of more opportunities for cases to go to
family youth justice system diversion as an alternative to court
filing.206,207
to suggest that, perhaps, the RTA law will remedy some of these issues in due
course over time.
204. Clark, supra note 202. Moreover, Judge Mendleson has been
reported as saying that the courts are prepared to “watch very carefully as
those [seventeen-year-old AO] cases come in and change resources as needed.”
Id. Some “change[s] in resources” she referred to included the option to train
State Supreme Court Justices to preside over the AO cases and designate them
as Family Court Justices. Id.
205. Eileen Grench, Big Influx of 17-year-olds Poses Next ‘Raise the Age’
Test, CITY (Sept. 23, 2019) https://thecity.nyc/2019/09/influx-of-17-year-oldsposes-raise-the-age-test-for-juvenile-justice-system.html.
206. Clark, supra note 202. Moreover, there is a procedure already in
effect whereby AOs who previously had to wait for cases to be transferred to
family court, because the Youth Part was not in session, can now skip that
step. Id. As long as there is an accessible magistrate, and the prosecutor
consents, a proceeding can avoid the criminal court altogether and instead
proceed through the family justice system. Id.
207. Other fundamental, perhaps constitutional, issues have surfaced as
the Raise the Age legislation has been implemented throughout the state,
including, but not limited to: AOs’ rights to access to counsel while in custody
of the police and/or state facilities, and/or prior to their arraignment and other
court appearances; housing adolescents in solitary confinement; and the
disparate treatment of New York’s thirteen-, fourteen-, and fifteen-year-old
offenders who, although younger than their AO counterparts, are not afforded
the same treatment under RTA legislation. WWBA CLE, supra note 67; see
N.Y. State Unified Court Sys., Crimes Committed by Children Between 7-19,
NYCOURTS.GOV,
https://www.nycourts.gov/courthelp/Criminal/crimesBy
Children.shtml (last visited Nov. 5, 2019) (describing Juvenile Deliquent(s)
and Juvenile Offender(s) designations that apply to seven to sixteen-year-olds
and thirteen- to fifteen-year-olds, respectively, and stating that Juvenile
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As such, it is abundantly clear that there remain substantial
pitfalls under the RTA Legislation which will have to be
addressed, likely sooner rather than later due to their
important, perhaps constitutional implications. Nonetheless,
there appears to be a strong foundation of case law, resources,
and people readily able and willing to safeguard the intention
behind the RTA law while dealing with the formulating issues
aforementioned, some of which are already recognized today.208
VII. Conclusion
New York’s enactment and implementation of the RTA law
reflects the basic standard of decency to treat kids as kids, as
has been understood across the nation and by this nation’s
highest court for decades. Moreover, the RTA legislation marks
a monumental step forward in New York’s efforts to create a
more fair, commonsense juvenile justice system that will endure
well into the future. However, although the RTA legislation is
an emblem for New York’s historic shift in juvenile justice, it is
not without flaws that are ripe for redress by the courts, the
Legislature, and those overseeing the statute’s implementation.
With the second phase of the RTA law being applied for
Offenders may be punished like adults). Paradoxically, these offenders would
invariably be younger than sixteen- and/or seventeen-year-old Adolescent
Offenders and receive harsher treatment. Id. Though compelling and relevant
to the RTA legislation, given this Article’s focus largely on the implementation
and effect the RTA’s provisions are currently having in the State’s courts and
attendant procedures, the far-reaching implications these issues contend with
are a topic for another law review note, or several, where they can be discussed
more fully. For Federal Cases arising from the Raise the Age legislation, see
J.B. v. Onondaga Cty., No. 5:19-CV-137 (LEK/TWD), 2019 WL 3776377
(N.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2019) (granting AOs’ motion for class certification and a
preliminary injunction against defendants to permit Adolescent Offenders and
Juvenile Offenders to consult with their lawyers privately in the courthouse
before their court appearances); Paykina v. Lewin, No. 9:19-cv-00061
(BKS/DJS), 2019 WL 2329688 (N.D.N.Y. May 31, 2019) (awarding preliminary
injunction against confinement in Adolescent Offender Separation Unit of AO
with mental illness on grounds of cruel and unusual punishment).
208. For example, in New York City, the “Working Group” is present in
all five boroughs, continues to meet regularly to monitor RTA’s progress,
discuss ideas, and analyze trends. City of N.Y., supra note 51. The Working
Group is comprised of the Administration for Children’s Services, Department
of Correction, Department of Education, Department of Probation, NYPD, New
York City Law Department, Office of Court Administration, Legal Aid Society,
Bronx Defenders, Brooklyn Defenders, and the District Attorney’s Offices. Id.
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seventeen-year-old offenders as of October 1, 2019, the onus falls
on the Legislature to provide the courts with the workable
mechanisms delineating sealing AO criminal records for
movants who have, by all accounts, outgrown their adolescent
behavior; in the absence of such mechanisms, courts will have to
apply ambiguous statutory language in removal proceedings
moving forward. The State would be remiss if it failed to address
emerging challenges and concerns identified and evaluated by
the courts, which, if unremedied, may permit the juvenile justice
system to revert to its past illogical execution. Because of the
varied outcomes that are expected to result from judges’
discretion and authority to remedy the deficiencies of RTA
legislation case by case, and the influx of AO cases which is
certain to occur with the implementation of the second phase, an
effective response is essential. Not only is clarification vital to
future processing of sealing and AO removal matters in the
courts, it is also essential to the longevity and success of the RTA
law altogether. In the alternative, the State’s courts will
continue to effectively displace the Legislature as to matters
falling under the purview of RTA and legislate as they see fit
from the proverbial bench.
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